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THE COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTION PLAN

A Hybrid Reform Path to Social Security Solvency

Combining a Phased Sunset of the Current System

with a Mandatory Hybrid Retirement System

Backed by a Sovereign Investment Fund

Working Draft — Version 1.0

Jason Robertson

Ohio, USA

v1.1 · Created April 2026 · Updated May 3, 2026 · Updated May 6, 2026 for v2.30.7 (Sovereign Fund capitalization)

Sources Baseline. Numerical claims in this document derive from the canonical sources cataloged in 05_Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx, including: Social Security Administration Trustees Reports 2023-2024 (the $63 trillion 75-year actuarial deficit figure used as the legacy-system comparison baseline); Combined Reform Model (04_Combined_Reform_Model.xlsx) for the $82 billion peak transition borrowing and the 99.9 percent reduction figure; IRS SOI 2023 for filer-population derivations. The white paper consolidates findings whose component sourcing is detailed in the underlying analytical documents and the Federal Fiscal Impact Analysis.

Executive Summary

Social Security faces an actuarial cliff. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund is projected to be depleted by 2033, after which incoming payroll taxes will cover only an estimated 77 percent of scheduled benefits. The standard policy responses—raise the retirement age, raise the payroll tax cap, cut benefits, or some combination—each impose narrow burdens on specific groups and have proven politically intractable for over two decades. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

This paper proposes an alternative: a phased sunset of the current pay-as-you-go system combined with the launch of a Hybrid Retirement System that splits mandatory contributions between individual 401(k) accounts and a collective sovereign investment fund. The two reforms operate in parallel. The Sovereign Fund’s investment returns offset the transition deficit of the legacy system while individual accounts replace traditional benefits for new entrants to the workforce.

Headline Findings

- Sunset alone is fiscally infeasible. A 50-year phase-out of Social Security with refundable tax credits to displaced workers, executed without a replacement system, requires approximately $63 trillion in cumulative transition financing. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

- Combined reform is essentially self-funding. Pairing the same sunset with a 12 percent mandatory hybrid contribution—20 percent of which flows to a sovereign investment fund—reduces peak transition borrowing to approximately $82 billion: a 99.9 percent reduction. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

- Individual outcomes improve. A worker entering the labor force at age 25 earning $50,000 retires with approximately $1.23 million, generating roughly $49,000 in annual sustainable retirement income—approximately 1.4 times the average current Social Security benefit. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

- The Sovereign Fund accumulates significant national wealth. Under base assumptions the fund grows to approximately $122 trillion over 60 years, comparable in scale to Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global on a per-capita basis. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

This proposal does not fit neatly within existing partisan retirement policy frameworks. It combines market-based individual accounts (a position historically associated with the political right) with mandatory employer contributions and a collective Sovereign Fund (positions historically associated with the political left). The proposal is best understood as an attempt to apply community-based fairness principles to the actuarial reality facing the program.

Document Structure

Section 1 establishes the problem and current trajectory. Section 2 surveys international comparables that inform the design. Section 3 details the three components of the proposal. Section 4 presents the analytical results from a year-by-year cash flow model. Section 5 addresses governance and implementation. Section 6 discusses limitations and open questions. Section 7 outlines next steps.

1. The Problem

1.1 The Actuarial Trajectory

Social Security operates on a pay-as-you-go basis: current workers’ Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes fund current retirees’ benefits in real time. The system maintains a Trust Fund as a buffer, but this buffer is small relative to ongoing obligations. According to the 2025 Trustees Report, the OASI Trust Fund is projected to be depleted in 2033, at which point incoming FICA receipts will cover only approximately 77 percent of scheduled benefits.

The arithmetic driver is demographic. When Social Security was established in 1935, there were roughly 42 workers paying into the system for every retiree drawing benefits. Today the ratio is approximately 2.7 to 1, and the Congressional Budget Office projects a continued decline. The system was designed in an era of high fertility, lower life expectancy, and continuous wage growth. Each of these underlying conditions has shifted significantly.

1.2 Why Conventional Reforms Have Stalled

Standard reform proposals concentrate burden on identifiable groups, which has proven politically prohibitive:

- Raising the retirement age imposes the burden disproportionately on workers in physically demanding occupations and those with shorter life expectancy.

- Eliminating the wage cap concentrates the cost on high earners and is politically polarizing.

- Means-testing benefits breaks the universalist insurance principle that has historically protected the program politically.

- Direct benefit cuts impose immediate hardship on current and near-term retirees, the most politically active demographic.

Each of these reforms is technically viable. None has assembled durable political coalitions. The 2005 Bush partial privatization initiative is the most recent significant attempt and was abandoned within months despite a unified government.

1.3 The Case for a Different Approach

The persistent stalemate suggests that the framing of reform itself may be the obstacle. Reforms that ask “who gives up something” face structural opposition. Reforms that ask “how do we build something better” may not. The proposal in this paper attempts the latter by combining three elements that, taken individually, have established political constituencies but have not previously been integrated.

2. International Comparables

Three foreign retirement systems inform the design of this proposal. Each has operated for decades and offers empirical evidence on different components of the hybrid model.

2.1 Australia: Mandatory Superannuation

Australia introduced mandatory employer-paid superannuation contributions in 1992, beginning at 3 percent of wages and rising to a current rate of 11.5 percent (scheduled to reach 12 percent in 2025). Contributions flow into individual accounts that workers manage with a range of investment options. Total system assets exceed AUD 3.9 trillion, larger than Australia’s gross domestic product. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

The Australian system demonstrates that mandatory employer contributions can be implemented without economic disruption, that individual account portability and choice are administratively manageable at national scale, and that compound growth over multi-decade horizons produces substantial individual wealth accumulation. The system has weathered multiple financial crises and remains broadly popular across political coalitions.

2.2 Singapore: The Central Provident Fund

Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF) requires combined employer and employee contributions of approximately 37 percent of wages, allocated across retirement, healthcare, and housing accounts. The CPF demonstrates that high mandatory contribution rates are sustainable in a developed economy and that integration of retirement, health, and housing savings within a unified mandatory framework can function efficiently. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

2.3 Norway: The Government Pension Fund Global

Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, formally known as the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), holds approximately USD 1.7 trillion in assets, equivalent to roughly 330 percent of Norway’s gross domestic product. The fund invests primarily in international equities, bonds, and real estate, following strict rules designed to insulate it from political influence. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

The GPFG governance model is particularly relevant to this proposal. Key features include passive index-weighted investment strategy (no active stock picking), a mandate to hold no Norwegian domestic equities (eliminating conflicts of interest with domestic political actors), an independent management board insulated from short-term political pressure, and transparent quarterly reporting on all holdings and transactions.

The Norwegian governance model is the central template for the Sovereign Fund component of this proposal. Adopting equivalent firewalls is essential to political viability.

3. The Proposal

3.1 Three Integrated Components

The Community Contribution Plan consists of three components implemented in parallel:

1. A phased sunset of the current Social Security system over a 50-year window, with full grandfathering of all current beneficiaries and workers within ten years of retirement age.

2. A mandatory Hybrid Retirement System requiring combined employer and employee contributions of 12 percent of covered wages, replacing the existing FICA structure for participating workers. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

3. A sovereign investment fund receiving 20 percent of all hybrid system contributions, governed under a Norwegian-style independent mandate, with returns disbursed to offset the legacy system’s transition deficit. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

3.2 Sunset Phase Mechanics

Workers aged 55 and older at the time of enactment (the “grandfathered cohort”) remain in the existing Social Security system and receive full benefits as currently scheduled. Workers younger than 55 transition to the new hybrid system on a linear schedule over the 50-year sunset window. Workers transitioning out of the legacy system receive refundable tax credits, weighted by age cohort, with a population-weighted average of approximately $85,000 per displaced worker, paid over six years.

3.3 Hybrid System Mechanics

The 12 percent total contribution divides as follows: (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

Component | Allocation | Purpose
--- | --- | ---
Individual 401(k) | 80% of contribution (9.6% of wages) | Personal retirement account, fully portable, individually owned
Sovereign Fund | 20% of contribution (2.4% of wages) | Collective investment vehicle, returns offset transition deficit

The split between employer and employee contributions follows current FICA convention: 7 percent employer, 5 percent employee. The 0.6 percentage-point increase relative to the current 12.4 percent FICA rate reflects the additional cost of building the Sovereign Fund. Contribution rates above the current FICA wage base apply on the same uncapped basis, mirroring the structure of Medicare contributions. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

3.4 Sovereign Fund Mechanics

The Sovereign Fund operates under a statutory mandate modeled on Norway’s GPFG with the following key parameters:

- Investment strategy: passive index-weighted across global equities (60 percent), global investment-grade bonds (30 percent), and real assets (10 percent). (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

- Domestic equity exclusion: the fund holds no individual U.S. equities directly, only diversified index instruments, eliminating the appearance of government as activist shareholder.

- Voting policy: all proxy votes follow a published, mechanical policy on routine corporate governance matters; abstention on social or political resolutions.

- Governance: an independent board of trustees with staggered terms, professional asset management staff, and a statutory firewall against political direction of investment decisions.

- Disbursement rule: annual disbursements capped at the lesser of 3 percent of fund assets (Norway’s sustainable rule) or the current legacy system deficit. Disbursements begin in year 12 to allow initial accumulation.

- Transparency: quarterly publication of all holdings, transactions, returns, and management costs; annual independent audit.

4. Analytical Results

4.1 Methodology

The analysis uses a deterministic year-by-year cash flow model projecting 60 years from a 2026 implementation date. The model tracks four primary populations: (1) grandfathered beneficiaries declining via mortality, (2) workers in the legacy system declining via the linear sunset schedule, (3) workers in the new hybrid system increasing via the same schedule and natural workforce growth, and (4) Sovereign Fund assets accumulating from contributions and returns. Six years of annual cash flow are computed for each population: gross inflows, gross outflows, net cash flow, and cumulative position.

The model incorporates Social Security Administration baseline data for current beneficiary count, average benefits, covered worker population, and total FICA receipts. Mortality projections use simplified actuarial bands. Investment returns use 6% annual real return on the Sovereign Fund and 5.5 percent on individual accounts, both in line with long-run Norwegian and Australian system experience.

4.2 Sunset-Only Baseline

As a baseline for comparison, the model first evaluates a sunset of the current Social Security system without any replacement mechanism. Under this scenario, the current Trust Fund is exhausted within approximately seven years of implementation. The cumulative fiscal position becomes increasingly negative as the legacy system continues to pay grandfathered benefits and refundable tax credits to displaced workers without replacement revenue. Peak cumulative borrowing reaches approximately $63 trillion in nominal terms over the 60-year window.

This result illustrates the central problem of pay-as-you-go reform: the system’s structural reliance on incoming worker contributions makes any unilateral phase-out fiscally infeasible without a parallel replacement revenue source.

4.3 Combined Reform Results

Adding the hybrid system and Sovereign Fund changes the trajectory dramatically. Under base assumptions:

Metric | Sunset Only | Combined Reform
--- | --- | ---
Peak transition borrowing | $63 trillion (See Sources Baseline.) | $82 billion (See Sources Baseline.)
Year of peak fiscal stress | Year 60 (2085) | Year 17 (2043)
Final cumulative position (Year 60) | -$63 trillion (See Sources Baseline.) | +$48.9 trillion (See Sources Baseline.)
Sovereign fund balance (Year 60) | N/A | $121.9 trillion (See Sources Baseline.)
Equilibrium achieved | No | Mostly self-funding

The combined reform achieves what the standalone sunset cannot: a path to fiscal solvency that honors all existing commitments. The transition is not entirely costless—a small borrowing peak occurs around year 17 as the legacy system’s deficit is at its peak and the Sovereign Fund has not yet fully matured—but the magnitude is manageable, equivalent to approximately 0.3 percent of GDP at the time of peak stress. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

4.4 Individual Account Outcomes

For a representative new entrant to the workforce (age 25, starting salary $50,000, 3 percent annual wage growth, 5.5 percent real investment return on the individual account), the model produces the following retirement outcome at age 67: (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

Metric | Value | Comparison
--- | --- | ---
Account balance at retirement | $1,227,000 | Personal asset, fully portable, inheritable
Annual sustainable retirement income (4% rule) | $49,081 | vs. ~$35,000 average current SS benefit
Income replacement ratio (vs. final salary) | 29.2% | Combined with personal savings supports comfortable retirement
Multiple vs. Social Security | 1.40x | 40% better than current SS for equivalent worker

The individual account result is intentionally conservative. It assumes a worker contributes only the mandatory 12 percent throughout their career and never contributes additional voluntary savings. Workers who supplement with voluntary contributions, take advantage of catch-up provisions later in their careers, or benefit from above-average wage growth would accumulate substantially more. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

4.5 Sensitivity Analysis

The model is sensitive to four primary inputs. Reasonable ranges for each produce the following directional effects:

Variable | Range Tested | Direction of Effect
--- | --- | ---
Phase-out window | 30–60 years | Longer windows reduce peak borrowing materially
Sovereign fund slice | 10–30% of contributions | Higher slice accelerates fund growth, reduces individual accounts proportionally
Investment returns | 4–7% real | Each 1pp materially affects long-run fund balance
Disbursement delay | 10–20 years | Longer delays produce a larger fund but more peak borrowing

None of the sensitivities tested fundamentally invalidates the central finding. Even under conservative assumptions (40-year window, 15 percent sovereign slice, 5 percent return, 15-year disbursement delay), peak borrowing remains under $5 trillion—an order of magnitude better than the sunset-only baseline. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

5. Governance and Implementation

5.1 The Central Governance Challenge

A Sovereign Fund that grows to $20 trillion or more in U.S. equities raises legitimate concerns about government as concentrated shareholder. Without explicit constraints, the fund could become a tool of whichever political faction controls its governance at any given time. Public Employees Retirement Association controversies in California, Texas, and other states—where pension funds have been used variously to advance environmental, social, or political objectives across multiple administrations—illustrate the risk. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

The Norwegian solution relies on statutory firewalls, not norms. A U.S. version would require equivalent statutory protection, ideally constitutionally entrenched.

5.2 Recommended Governance Framework

- Statutory passive mandate. The fund’s investment strategy is fixed by statute as passive index-weighted. Active management is prohibited.

- Domestic equity exclusion. The fund may not hold individual U.S. equities. Index exposure is obtained through diversified instruments only, eliminating direct shareholder relationships.

- Mechanical voting policy. Proxy votes follow a published, mechanical policy on standard governance matters. Abstention is mandatory on social or political resolutions.

- Independent board. Trustees serve staggered ten-year terms with confirmation requiring a supermajority of the Senate. Removal requires cause and a two-thirds vote.

- Transparency. All holdings published quarterly. All transactions published with one-quarter delay. Annual independent audit by GAO (Government Accountability Office).

- Disbursement protection. The sustainable disbursement rate is fixed by statute and may be adjusted only by supermajority vote.

5.3 Implementation Sequence

A practical implementation would proceed in four phases:

4. Phase 1 (Years 0–2): Authorizing Legislation. Statutory framework, Sovereign Fund charter, governance structure, and transition financing mechanism enacted.

5. Phase 2 (Year 2): System Launch. Hybrid contribution system begins for new workforce entrants. Sovereign fund accumulates initial capital. No legacy beneficiaries affected.

6. Phase 3 (Years 2–52): Active Transition. Workers under age 55 transition to the new system on the linear schedule. Tax credits paid to displaced workers. Sovereign fund disbursements begin in year 12 to offset legacy deficit.

7. Phase 4 (Year 52+): Steady State. Legacy system fully sunset (residual obligations to remaining grandfathered beneficiaries continue). Hybrid system operates as primary national retirement infrastructure.

6. Limitations and Open Questions

6.1 What This Model Does Not Address

- Disability Insurance and Survivors Benefits. The proposal addresses only the OASI portion of Social Security. The Disability Insurance (SSDI) program serves approximately 8.5 million beneficiaries and Survivors Benefits serve approximately 5.8 million beneficiaries. Both require separate continuation under any reform, funded through dedicated payroll allocations not modeled here.

- Market volatility. The model assumes smooth annual returns. Real markets exhibit significant volatility. Catastrophic market drawdowns near retirement could materially affect individual account outcomes. Mitigation would require either mandatory annuitization options or a public backstop, both of which add complexity.

- Behavioral effects. The model does not account for participant behavior such as early withdrawal pressure, participation gaming, or political pressure to weaken contribution requirements. Australia’s super system has experienced erosion via early access provisions during periods of stress.

- Distributional effects. The model uses population-weighted averages. Lower-income workers, gig workers, those with interrupted careers, and the disabled would not accumulate the projected balances. The proposal as currently structured replaces a progressive program (current SS replacement rates favor lower earners) with a less progressive one. A means-tested supplement would address this but is not modeled here.

6.2 Open Design Questions

- Treatment of self-employed and gig workers. Current SS coverage extends through self-employment tax. The hybrid system requires additional design for non-W-2 workers.

- Public sector workers. Approximately 6 million state and local government employees are not currently covered by Social Security. Integration with existing public pension systems requires explicit treatment.

- Bequest treatment. Individual accounts are inheritable assets, which represents a significant change from Social Security. Estate tax interactions and equity considerations require analysis.

- International workers and totalization. Existing Social Security totalization agreements with 30 countries require adaptation under the new system.

6.3 What Would Strengthen the Analysis

This paper presents a deterministic exploratory model. A serious policy adoption would require additional analytical depth that is beyond the scope of this initial proposal but is well within the capacity of established institutions:

- Microsimulation with cohort-by-cohort tracking using Social Security Administration data.

- Stochastic Monte Carlo modeling of investment return distributions.

- Behavioral parameter estimation drawing on Australian and Singaporean implementation experience.

- Distributional analysis by income decile, race, gender, and geography.

- General equilibrium effects on labor markets, savings rates, and capital allocation.

7. Next Steps

7.1 What This Paper Is and Is Not

This is a proposal for serious analytical consideration, not a finished policy. Its purpose is to establish that a hybrid sunset-and-replacement structure is mathematically viable and to invite rigorous critique from established policy institutions.

The author is not a credentialed economist or a policy professional. The strength of the proposal rests on its internal consistency and its alignment with successful international comparables, not on the author’s credentials. Productive engagement with this paper from any reader regardless of professional background is welcomed.

7.2 Invited Critique

The author specifically invites critical review on the following points:

- Whether the simplified mortality and contribution models materially distort the headline conclusions.

- Whether the governance framework as specified is robust against the political pressures that have historically degraded similar institutions.

- Whether the proposed contribution rates can withstand stress scenarios involving recession, demographic shock, or sustained low returns.

- Whether the distributional effects, properly modeled, would erode the universalist political appeal that the proposal’s framing relies upon.

7.3 Pathways for Engagement

Comments, critique, and engagement are welcomed from any source. The author will respond to substantive technical feedback and will publish material revisions of this paper as warranted by such feedback. Readers in policy, academic, or political institutions are particularly invited to suggest improvements or to indicate interest in collaborative refinement of the proposal.

The Community Contribution Plan rests on a simple proposition: a fair retirement system asks everyone to contribute and ensures everyone benefits. The current system was built on this premise and remains popular for the same reason. The mechanism it uses to honor that premise has reached the limits of its viability. This proposal preserves the principle by changing the mechanism.