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A development direction document, not a candidate Pillar Thirteen

v1.0 · Created May 7, 2026 for v3.7.4 · Jason Robertson · Ohio · 2026 · Status: Research direction (not a substantiated pillar)

# Origin and Framing

This research note emerged from a conversation about extending the platform's infrastructure to enable citizen-initiated accountability mechanisms. The underlying observation is that the world moves faster than the political system; that when traditional checks and balances are bypassed by a person or party in charge, citizens have limited recourse until the next election; and that the platform's existing investment in transparency and infrastructure (particularly Pillar Seven Civic Infrastructure) could be extended to enable citizens to function as an additional check and balance, allowing course correction sooner than waiting for political terms to expire.

This note documents the architectural thinking, constitutional landscape, design options, and open questions for that direction. It is explicitly NOT framed as a candidate Pillar Thirteen for the platform. The reasons for that framing distinction are explained below: this direction sits in a different category from the existing twelve pillars (constitutional infrastructure rather than policy infrastructure), faces different feasibility constraints (constitutional amendment required for the binding citizen-action portion), operates on a different timeline (decades rather than years), and requires a different coalition for advancement. The note captures the thinking so it can inform future work without committing the platform to the direction.

Sources baseline. Numerical claims and historical references derive from: Pew Research Center polling on public trust in government; Pew and Gallup polling on direct democracy mechanisms; Initiative and Referendum Institute data on state ballot initiatives; Swiss Federal Chancellery documentation of the federal popular initiative; California Secretary of State documentation of the recall mechanism; European Citizens Initiative documentation; Federal Election Commission documentation of campaign finance regulation; Supreme Court case law on political speech (Buckley v. Valeo 1976; Citizens United v. FEC 2010; New York Times v. Sullivan 1964); Constitutional text (Article I Sections 2 and 3; Article II Section 4; Article V; First Amendment); academic literature on direct democracy from political science and constitutional law. Empirical claims requiring credentialed external review are tracked in the open issues section below.

# Why This Is Constitutional Infrastructure, Not Policy Infrastructure

The platform's twelve pillars share a common feature: they apply coherent policy architecture to specific domains (retirement, education, healthcare, housing, climate, immigration, etc.) within the existing constitutional structure. They are policy infrastructure: federal programs, contribution mechanisms, fee structures, regulatory frameworks. None of them require constitutional amendment; all of them operate within the existing federal powers as enumerated in the Constitution and as affirmed by Supreme Court precedent.

Citizen-initiated accountability mechanisms (citizen votes that trigger impeachment proceedings, recall, or other binding institutional action) are structurally different. Federal impeachment is constitutionally specified to the House (charging) and Senate (trial) per Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 and Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6-7. Federal recall does not exist; only some state and local officials are recallable, and the rules vary by state. Adding direct citizen-impeachment authority or federal recall authority would require a constitutional amendment, which needs two-thirds of both chambers plus three-quarters of states (or a constitutional convention) per Article V.

This category distinction matters for three reasons. First, feasibility: constitutional amendments are exceptionally hard to pass. The most recent amendments (24th through 27th) were ratified between 1964 and 1992 with the 27th being a 200-year-old proposed amendment finally ratified. Substantive new amendments (changing constitutional structure) typically take generations. Second, timeline: a viable constitutional amendment process is a 20-30 year project at minimum, fundamentally different from the 5-15 year transitions the existing pillars assume. Third, coalition: the policy-infrastructure pillars require alignment among economists, policy-area experts, and implementation agencies; constitutional infrastructure requires alignment among constitutional law scholars, civic institutions, state governments, and a cross-partisan supermajority of political leadership over an extended period.

The conclusion is not that this direction should be abandoned. The conclusion is that it should be developed on its own track, with its own timeline and coalition, while the policy-infrastructure pillars proceed on the platform's established timeline.

# Existing Constitutional Landscape

## Federal Impeachment

Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 grants the House of Representatives the sole power of impeachment. Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7 grant the Senate the sole power to try impeachments and require a two-thirds Senate vote for conviction. Article II, Section 4 specifies the impeachable offenses: treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. The Constitution provides no role for citizens in impeachment beyond electing the members of Congress who hold the impeachment power. Citizens cannot directly impeach federal officials, cannot directly trigger impeachment proceedings, and cannot directly vote on impeachment outcomes.

## Federal Recall

No federal recall mechanism exists for any federal office (President, Vice President, members of Congress, federal judges, executive branch officials). The Constitution specifies fixed terms (Article I for Congress; Article II for the President and Vice President; Article III for federal judges who serve during good behavior). Federal officials can only be removed through impeachment (for cause) or by losing the next election (for elected officials). Some scholars have argued that recall could be implemented for members of Congress through state-level mechanisms; others argue this would violate the Qualifications Clause and the Seventeenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on federal recall.

## State-Level Analogs

Approximately nineteen states permit recall of state-level elected officials. The mechanism varies: California requires 12 percent of voters from the prior election to sign petitions; other states use other thresholds. Twenty-six states permit some form of citizen-initiated ballot measure (initiatives that go directly to the ballot if signature thresholds are met). These state-level mechanisms have functioned for over a century in some cases (Oregon adopted initiative and referendum in 1902); they provide empirical evidence on direct-democracy outcomes that informs the federal design question. Notable lessons: thresholds matter enormously for what actually proceeds; informational quality matters for outcome quality; judicial review of citizen-initiated measures matters for protecting constitutional rights.

## Constitutional Amendment Process

Article V specifies two paths for amendment. The first: two-thirds of both chambers of Congress propose an amendment, then three-quarters of state legislatures ratify it. The second: two-thirds of state legislatures call for a constitutional convention, which proposes amendments, then three-quarters of states ratify the convention's proposals. The first path has been used for all 27 amendments. The second path has never been used. The supermajorities required (67 percent in Congress; 75 percent of states) make amendment exceptionally difficult, particularly for amendments that affect the existing political balance. This is the central feasibility constraint for the binding citizen-action portion of this research note.

# The Two-Track Architecture

The constitutional landscape suggests a two-track architecture: separate what is feasible without constitutional amendment from what requires it, and develop them on their own timelines with their own coalition strategies.

## Track A: Transparency and Information Infrastructure

Track A consists of mechanisms that improve government transparency, citizen information access, and accountability surface area without modifying the constitutional structure. Components include real-time financial transparency (every federal dollar, every legislative vote, every contract, every beneficial ownership disclosure); multi-perspective explainer platforms (legislation explained from multiple recognized perspectives, with sourcing); comprehensive video archives of all federal proceedings (already partially exists through C-SPAN; could be expanded and made more searchable); standardized open-data requirements for all non-classified government information; verified-identity petition platforms operating with non-binding effect (citizens can petition the government, signatures verified, but petitions do not directly trigger institutional action); and standardized ad disclosure platforms (who paid for what political message, in machine-readable format).

Track A is achievable without constitutional amendment. Most components are feasible through statute, executive action, or expansion of existing federal transparency infrastructure (FOIA, USAspending.gov, the Federal Register). Track A could be substantially implemented within 5-10 years if pursued deliberately. Track A also extends Pillar Seven Civic Infrastructure of the platform: where Pillar Seven addresses physical and digital infrastructure (broadband, cellular, 911, identity theft reduction), Track A addresses informational infrastructure (transparency platforms, multi-perspective explainers, petition platforms). Track A could be substantively built into Pillar Seven's expanded scope without requiring a separate Pillar Thirteen.

## Track B: Citizen-Initiated Action Mechanisms

Track B consists of mechanisms that grant citizens binding power to trigger institutional action (impeachment proceedings, recall, mandatory legislative consideration, court hearings on specific matters). Track B requires constitutional amendment for federal-level binding effect, because the Constitution currently grants these powers to specific institutions and specifies how they operate.

Track B's design is the substance of this research note. The architectural vision (described in detail below) involves tiered escalation from petition to vote to institutional action, with multiple thresholds at each stage to prevent weaponization, mandatory pre-vote informational requirements to address misinformation concerns, and explicit constraints on what citizen-initiated actions can do (cannot override constitutional rights; cannot function as harassment of individuals; cannot bypass judicial review). Track B's implementation depends on Track A: the transparency and information infrastructure must be functional and trusted before binding citizen-action mechanisms can be safely added to the constitutional structure.

# Track A: Transparency and Information Infrastructure (Detail)

## Real-Time Financial Transparency

Substantial expansion of USAspending.gov and similar federal transparency platforms to provide real-time, granular, machine-readable disclosure of: every federal contract above some minimal threshold; beneficial ownership of every contracting entity; every federal payment with recipient identification; every legislative vote with identification of every member's vote; personal financial disclosures of all senior officials and immediate family with real-time updates; conflict-of-interest registries with real-time updates; lobbyist registration and contact tracking; campaign finance flows with same-day disclosure for all transactions above some threshold. Implementation requires statute (campaign finance reform, expanded financial disclosure requirements) plus executive branch implementation (data infrastructure, open formats, public APIs). Achievable in approximately five years with deliberate effort. Estimated annual cost: ~$2-4 billion (operational infrastructure plus enforcement). This sits within the policy-infrastructure category and could be funded through Pillar Seven's Federal Infrastructure Fee.

## Multi-Perspective Explainer Platforms

A federally-supported platform providing standardized, multi-perspective explanations of all proposed and enacted legislation, regulatory proposals, court rulings of significance, and major executive actions. Each explainer presents the topic from multiple recognized perspectives (typically three to five distinct viewpoints from across the political spectrum) with explicit sourcing for each claim and clear identification of which claims are empirical (testable), which are interpretive (analytical), and which are value-based (political). The platform does not pick winners among perspectives; it surfaces them with rigor. Implementation requires establishing the institution that produces the explainers (this is the hard design question, addressed in detail in a later section). Achievable through statute creating an independent agency with appropriate governance structure. Estimated annual cost: ~$500 million to $1 billion depending on scope.

## Comprehensive Government Proceedings Archive

Expansion of existing federal proceedings archives (C-SPAN provides much of this for Congress; federal court hearings are partially recorded but with substantial gaps; executive branch deliberations are largely not recorded). The vision includes universal recording and archiving of all non-classified federal proceedings: congressional hearings, committee meetings, federal court hearings, regulatory proceedings, and significant executive branch deliberations. AI-assisted searchability makes the archive useful for citizens, journalists, and researchers. Implementation requires statute (mandatory recording requirements with exceptions for legitimately classified matters), funding, and infrastructure. Achievable in approximately 5-10 years. Could be administered by the existing congressional Government Accountability Office or a new dedicated agency.

## Open-Data Requirements

Statutory requirement that all non-classified federal data be released in standardized open formats with machine-readable APIs, real-time or near-real-time updates, and clear documentation. This goes substantially beyond current FOIA practice (which is reactive and slow). The model: government data is presumptively public unless specifically classified; release is default rather than upon request; format is structured rather than document-dump. Implementation requires statute (open-data act with teeth, criminal penalties for non-compliance, citizen standing to enforce) plus infrastructure investment. Achievable in approximately 5 years. Substantially reduces the corruption surface area by making opacity itself illegal rather than merely difficult.

## Verified-Identity Petition Platforms (Non-Binding Initially)

A federally-supported platform allowing any citizen with verified identity to create a petition on any matter, with verified-signature collection from other citizens. Petitions are non-binding initially: meeting any threshold does not directly trigger institutional action. The platform serves three purposes during this initial phase: building the technical and institutional infrastructure (verified-identity systems, signature-verification mechanisms, threshold-tracking systems); building the track record (which kinds of petitions succeed, which kinds fail, which kinds get weaponized); and building public familiarity with the mechanism. This phase serves as the foundation for Track B: when Track B's binding mechanisms are added (via constitutional amendment), they would build on the operational infrastructure proven during Track A's non-binding phase. Estimated initial phase: 10-15 years of non-binding operation before Track B amendment is politically viable.

## Standardized Ad Disclosure Platforms

Statutory requirement that all political advertising (whether from candidates, parties, or independent expenditure organizations) be registered in a standardized federal disclosure platform within 24 hours of first appearance. The platform records: who paid for the ad, the ad's content, the targeting parameters (where it ran, to which demographics), and the spending amount. Citizens, journalists, and researchers can search and analyze political advertising in real time. This is achievable without First Amendment challenge because it requires disclosure rather than regulating content. Implementation: amend the Federal Election Campaign Act and equivalent regulations. Achievable in approximately 3 years.

# Track B: Citizen-Initiated Action Mechanisms (Detail)

## Tiered Escalation Design

The architectural vision involves tiered escalation: a citizen petition must clear successive thresholds before it produces binding institutional action. This structure prevents weaponization by frivolous or coordinated-minority actions while preserving genuine citizen power when supermajority support exists. The proposed tiers are: petition stage (citizen creates petition with verified identity); review stage (independent body verifies petition is legally valid and within scope); signature stage (petition must collect signatures from a meaningful percentage of voters); vote-trigger stage (signatures crossing a higher threshold trigger nationwide vote); informational period (mandatory waiting period during which the official explainer is published and public hearings are held); voting stage (citizens cast ballots after meeting informational requirement); outcome stage (vote result triggers institutional action rather than directly imposing the outcome).

The critical design feature is the final step: vote outcomes trigger institutional action rather than directly imposing outcomes. A successful citizen vote on impeachment, for example, would require the House to take up impeachment proceedings (rather than directly impeaching the official). A successful citizen vote on a law would require Congress to take up the bill (rather than directly enacting it). A successful citizen vote on a judicial matter would require the relevant court to hear the case (rather than directly imposing a verdict). This design preserves the institutional roles and judicial review while granting citizens the power to force consideration.

## Threshold Calibration

Thresholds are the central design parameter. International and state experience suggests the following ranges. Petition initiation: any citizen with verified identity (no threshold). Petition review trigger: ~1-2 percent of voters from prior election (Switzerland uses approximately this; California ballot initiative uses similar). Signature stage threshold to trigger nationwide vote: ~5-10 percent of voters from prior election (this is calibrated to be achievable for genuine citizen movements but infeasible for coordinated minority actions; California recall uses 12 percent specifically for recall which is more demanding). Vote outcome threshold for institutional action: simple majority (50 percent + 1) for less significant actions like forcing legislative consideration; supermajority (60-67 percent) for more significant actions like triggering impeachment proceedings or recall. The 75 percent threshold mentioned in the originating discussion is too high to be functional and would render the mechanism essentially inert.

The thresholds should be specified in the constitutional amendment itself (not in implementing legislation), to prevent capture by political majorities adjusting thresholds for partisan benefit. The thresholds should be reviewed periodically (perhaps every 25 years) through constitutional amendment if needed; this is appropriately slow given the magnitude of the design decision.

## Pre-Vote Informational Requirement

The most significant defense against misinformation-driven outcomes: each voter must complete a pre-vote informational requirement before casting a ballot. This requirement consists of viewing or reading a non-partisan official explainer that presents the question being voted on, the arguments for and against the action, the empirical evidence relevant to the question, the constitutional and legal context, and the consequences of each possible outcome. The explainer is approximately 15-30 minutes of video content or equivalent reading material. The voter must demonstrate completion (a simple comprehension check at the end, not a partisan litmus test). The pre-vote informational requirement applies to all citizen-initiated votes, with possible extension to general elections in some forms (this is more constitutionally complex). Israel and several European democracies have implemented variations of pre-vote information requirements with positive results.

## Constraints on Citizen-Initiated Actions

Citizen-initiated actions, even if approved by supermajority vote, cannot override constitutional rights (cannot vote to restrict First Amendment protections, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, or other constitutional guarantees), cannot function as harassment of individuals (constraints on what private matters can be subject to citizen vote), cannot bypass judicial review (federal courts retain authority to review constitutionality of citizen-initiated outcomes, just as they review legislative actions), and cannot violate international treaty obligations entered into through established processes. These constraints would be specified in the constitutional amendment itself.

# The Non-Partisan Information Question

The most difficult single design question is institutional: who creates the non-partisan informational content for the pre-vote requirement? If a partisan body produces it, the content is not non-partisan. If an ostensibly independent body produces it, who appoints the body? How is the body accountable? The informational content itself becomes a locus of political capture, potentially more consequential than the citizen vote it informs. This is the design's hardest problem and the question that most needs further development before the architecture is implementable.

## Possible Mechanisms

Sortition-based citizen jury approach: a randomly-selected sample of approximately 1,000-2,000 citizens reviews each draft explainer and approves or rejects it by supermajority vote. The jury is selected fresh for each explainer (preventing capture of the jury itself). The jury has expert advisors (constitutional lawyers, subject-matter experts, communications experts) who provide information but do not vote. Strengths: highly resistant to capture; matches the citizen-democracy ethos; produces explainers reflecting reasoned majority view among diverse citizens. Weaknesses: slow (each explainer takes weeks to produce); complex to administer; vulnerable to media campaigns aimed at jury members during deliberation.

Multi-party consensus committee approach: a committee with mandatory representation from major political parties (and minor parties meeting some threshold of support) must approve explainers by supermajority vote. Strengths: fast; produces explainers acceptable to multiple political perspectives; well-established institutional precedent in legislative committees. Weaknesses: vulnerable to gridlock when parties refuse consensus; defines parties in a way that may exclude emerging political movements; potentially produces lowest-common-denominator content.

Court-appointed bipartisan panel approach: federal judges (perhaps the Chief Justice and the senior associate justice in dissent on most recent term) appoint a rotating panel of explainer producers. The panel is professionalized (paid staff with subject-matter expertise) but accountable to the appointing body. Strengths: combines professionalism with accountability; uses an existing trusted institution (the federal judiciary); rotating membership prevents long-term capture. Weaknesses: depends on judicial independence (which itself is contested); produces explainers that may seem distant from citizens; vulnerable to the broader politicization of the judiciary.

Multi-perspective format approach: rather than having a single body produce a single non-partisan explainer, statute requires that each explainer include at least 3-5 recognized perspectives, with each perspective produced by an entity associated with that perspective and given equal time and prominence. Strengths: avoids the problem of appointing a single producer; surfaces actual diversity of views rather than a manufactured consensus; aligns with First Amendment values around marketplace of ideas. Weaknesses: requires defining recognized perspectives (who decides?); produces longer content (potentially reducing voter completion); vulnerable to the production-quality gap (well-funded perspectives produce better content than less-funded ones).

The note does not recommend a single mechanism. Each carries trade-offs. The realistic answer is probably a hybrid: multi-perspective format for ordinary explainers (most citizen-initiated questions), with sortition-based citizen jury review for high-stakes explainers (impeachment-trigger votes, recall votes). The detailed design of the institutional arrangement is one of the most important open questions for further development.

# First Amendment Constraints

The Supreme Court has been highly protective of political speech under the First Amendment. Several proposed elements of the architecture face potential constitutional challenge.

## Clearly Constitutional

Disclosure requirements (who paid for political messaging) are well-established as constitutional, including under Citizens United v. FEC. Length and timing limits on advertising may be constitutional depending on specifics (campaign-period limits in some forms have been upheld). Equal-time provisions (broadcast media must offer equal time to opposing candidates) have been upheld for broadcast media; their application to modern digital media is unsettled. Truth-in-labeling requirements (cannot claim endorsement falsely; cannot impersonate other candidates or parties) are generally constitutional under fraud doctrine.

## Faces Challenge

Mandatory factual content for political advertising (a 'must be factual' requirement) faces heavy First Amendment challenge. New York Times v. Sullivan and subsequent cases have established that even false statements about public figures receive First Amendment protection unless they meet the actual-malice standard. A blanket requirement that political ads be factual would likely be struck down as overbroad. The pre-vote informational video may face challenge as compelled speech (requiring voters to consume specific content); the constitutional analysis depends on whether voting is treated as a fundamental right (which arguably permits more regulation) or a form of expressive activity (which is more protected). Anti-negative-ad rules face challenge because defining negative is inherently political (comparing voting records is fact-based criticism that some perceive as negative).

## Workable Approaches

Workable approaches that respect First Amendment values: rely on disclosure rather than content regulation; create alternative high-quality information channels (the multi-perspective explainers) rather than restricting low-quality channels; use post hoc enforcement of fraud and defamation rather than pre-publication content review; create incentives for fact-based campaigning (subsidies for participation in formal debates, for example) rather than penalties for non-fact-based campaigning; rely on voter-completion requirements (must view explainer before voting) rather than viewer-completion requirements (must view explainer to be permitted to advertise). The architecture is implementable with First Amendment-respecting design choices, but the design choices that achieve First Amendment respect are different from the most direct interventions.

# Sequencing Strategy

The two-track architecture suggests a deliberate sequencing strategy.

Phase one (years 1-10): Build Track A. Implement transparency and information infrastructure. Establish multi-perspective explainer platform. Establish verified-identity petition platform with non-binding effect. Implement open-data requirements. Implement standardized ad disclosure. Build the operational infrastructure (technical systems, institutional processes, public familiarity, track record) that Track B would later depend on. This phase is achievable through statute and executive action; no constitutional amendment required.

Phase two (years 5-15, overlapping with Phase one): Build trust and track record. Track A operations produce concrete data: which kinds of citizen petitions succeed, which fail, which get weaponized. Multi-perspective explainers are tested; the institutional design is refined based on experience. Public trust builds (or fails to build) based on observed performance. The transparency infrastructure itself reduces corruption surface area, which builds trust in the broader institutions. By the end of phase two, the Track A mechanisms are well-understood and either trusted or known to be insufficient.

Phase three (years 15-25): Constitutional amendment for Track B. With Track A operating successfully and a track record demonstrating that the informational and procedural infrastructure works, the constitutional amendment for Track B becomes politically feasible. The amendment proposal specifies the binding citizen-action mechanism, the threshold parameters, the constraints on what citizen-initiated actions can do, and the transition mechanics. Amendment ratification under Article V's supermajority requirement; if successful, Track B begins operation. This phase carries the highest uncertainty: even with strong Track A track record, constitutional amendment is exceptionally difficult.

Phase four (years 20-30 onward): Track B operational. Citizen-initiated action mechanisms function alongside the existing constitutional structure. The architecture as a whole has reached its mature form. Periodic review and refinement of thresholds and procedures occurs through constitutional amendment if needed.

This sequencing has several virtues: it does the achievable work first (reducing dependence on constitutional amendment for early progress); it builds the institutional and technical infrastructure that the eventual amendment depends on; it builds the public trust required for the amendment to be politically viable; it provides empirical evidence to inform the amendment's specific design; and it does not require waiting for the amendment to deliver substantial benefits.

# International Precedents

## Switzerland

Switzerland has the world's most developed direct-democracy infrastructure. The federal popular initiative requires 100,000 signatures (approximately 2 percent of voting population) within 18 months to trigger a nationwide vote on a proposed constitutional amendment. Approximately 200 federal popular initiatives have been put to a vote since the mechanism's introduction in 1891; approximately 10 percent have passed. The Swiss optional referendum permits citizens to challenge laws passed by parliament: 50,000 signatures trigger a referendum on the law. The Swiss model demonstrates that direct democracy can function over more than a century; the relatively low pass rate suggests the mechanism is appropriately demanding; the long history provides evidence on both successes and failures of the model.

## California Recall

California's gubernatorial recall mechanism requires petition signatures from 12 percent of voters in the prior gubernatorial election within 160 days. Successful petition triggers a special election. The mechanism has been used twice successfully in California history (Gray Davis recalled in 2003; Gavin Newsom retained in 2021). The 2003 recall is studied as both a successful exercise of citizen power and a cautionary case (the recall was funded substantially by a single wealthy donor; the resulting election produced unexpected outcomes). Lessons: thresholds matter; informational quality matters; campaign-finance dynamics carry over to citizen-initiated votes.

## European Citizens' Initiative

The European Union's European Citizens' Initiative permits 1 million EU citizens (across at least 7 member states) to invite the European Commission to propose legislation on matters within EU competence. The mechanism is non-binding (the Commission may decline to act). It has been used dozens of times since 2012; relatively few initiatives have produced substantial policy change. The EU experience suggests that non-binding citizen-initiative mechanisms can build awareness and demonstrate citizen engagement without producing the chaos that critics fear; the lack of binding effect, however, also limits the mechanism's impact.

## Israel

Israeli election law requires that voters receive standardized informational materials before voting. The materials are prepared by an official body with multi-party representation. The Israeli system demonstrates that pre-vote informational requirements can be implemented and operate over decades; the Israeli political environment is highly contested but the informational system itself has not been a major source of contention. This is encouraging for the feasibility of similar requirements in the U.S. context.

## Other Lessons from International Experience

Direct-democracy mechanisms operate successfully in many democracies (Switzerland, several U.S. states, multiple European countries, several Latin American countries). They are not destabilizing in practice when properly designed. Common design features in successful systems: meaningful but achievable thresholds; mandatory information requirements; judicial review of outcomes for constitutional compliance; constraints on what can be put to citizen vote (cannot override constitutional rights, cannot function as harassment, etc.); transparent funding and disclosure of petition campaigns. Failed direct-democracy implementations typically have thresholds set too low (allowing trivial matters to consume resources), thresholds set too high (rendering the mechanism inert), or insufficient informational requirements (producing outcomes driven by misinformation).

# Reducing Corruption Surface Area

The originating discussion correctly observed that government opacity creates surface area for criminal and corrupt activity. Greater transparency reduces that surface area. The specific mechanisms achievable without constitutional amendment include the items discussed in Track A above plus several specific items worth noting separately.

Strengthened whistleblower protections: criminal penalties for retaliation, expanded scope of covered activities, monetary rewards for substantiated disclosures of fraud (the False Claims Act qui tam provisions are an existing model that could be expanded), and protected channels for disclosure to oversight bodies. FOIA expansion: shorter mandatory response times (30 days standard, 7 days for routine requests), criminal penalties for non-compliance by federal officials, citizen standing to enforce, narrower interpretation of permitted exemptions. Personal financial disclosure for senior officials and immediate family: real-time updates, machine-readable formats, blockchain-style audit trails for changes (showing when and how disclosures were updated), and strict enforcement with criminal penalties for false or omitted disclosures. Real-time conflict-of-interest registries: every meeting between regulated parties and regulators, every contract negotiation, every legislative office contact above some threshold logged in a public registry. Beneficial ownership transparency: every entity contracting with the federal government must disclose ultimate beneficial owners, with criminal penalties for false disclosure. Lobbyist transparency: all lobbying contacts logged with detail on topic, position taken, and outcome sought.

These mechanisms together would substantially reduce the corruption surface area at the federal level. They are technically and politically challenging but constitutionally straightforward. Implementation through comprehensive legislation (perhaps an Anti-Corruption and Transparency Act) is feasible. The Congressional Research Service has produced detailed proposals along these lines that could inform the specific design. This constitutes a substantial portion of what the originating discussion was asking for, achievable without the constitutional amendment burden.

# Open Issues and Limits

This research note identifies the architectural vision and the major design questions but does not resolve all of them. Several items require further development before this direction is implementable.

The non-partisan information institutional design: which mechanism (or hybrid) actually produces high-quality, trustworthy explainers at scale for the wide range of topics that might come to citizen vote? This is the central institutional design question and warrants substantial further research drawing on political science, communications theory, and empirical comparative analysis of existing mechanisms in other democracies.

Threshold calibration for evolving political conditions: thresholds that are appropriate today may become inappropriate as political conditions evolve (population growth, partisan distribution shifts, technology changes affecting petition mechanics). How is calibration maintained without subjecting thresholds to ongoing political manipulation?

Coordination with federal-state-tribal authority: citizen-initiated federal action mechanisms do not automatically address state-level issues, where existing recall and ballot-initiative mechanisms vary substantially. How does the federal mechanism coordinate with state mechanisms? Tribal sovereignty creates a third axis of authority that must be respected; how do citizen-initiated federal actions interact with tribal sovereignty?

Voting infrastructure security: the proposed mechanisms depend on verified-identity voting that is both secure and accessible. The technical and institutional design of this infrastructure is a major challenge with substantial security implications. The mechanism would be a high-value target for sophisticated adversaries (including nation-state actors). Mitigation: build initially as non-binding (Phase one above) so that successful attack does not produce binding outcome; refine technology and institutional processes through this phase; add binding effect only after security is demonstrated.

First Amendment doctrine evolution: First Amendment doctrine is not static; Supreme Court interpretation evolves over decades. The constitutional analysis above reflects current doctrine; future interpretation could shift in ways that either expand or constrain the feasibility of various design elements. Architectural design should be robust to plausible doctrinal shifts.

Coalition building for constitutional amendment: the realistic path to Track B requires assembling a cross-partisan supermajority coalition over an extended period. What is the realistic coalition strategy? Which constituencies have the most to gain (and to lose) from the proposed architecture? How does the proposal navigate the major political alignments of any given era? This is fundamentally a political-strategy question that goes beyond the policy-design scope of this research note.

# Relationship to the Existing Platform

This research note documents a development direction that overlaps with but is distinct from the existing twelve-pillar platform.

Track A (transparency and information infrastructure) substantially overlaps with Pillar Seven (Civic Infrastructure). Pillar Seven currently addresses physical and digital infrastructure (broadband, cellular, 911 modernization, identity theft reduction). The Track A vision extends Pillar Seven's scope to include informational infrastructure: real-time transparency platforms, multi-perspective explainers, verified-identity petition platforms, open-data systems. This expansion could be folded into Pillar Seven's substantiation in a future iteration if Jason chooses to develop it that way; the funding mechanism (Federal Infrastructure Fee plus sovereign fund returns) would scale appropriately.

Track B (citizen-initiated action mechanisms) does not fit within the existing twelve-pillar architecture. It is constitutional infrastructure rather than policy infrastructure. If pursued, it would proceed on its own track with its own coalition and timeline, potentially over decades. It is not a candidate Pillar Thirteen because the architectural category is different and the timeline is different from the existing pillars.

The note does not recommend a specific course of action regarding this direction. The decision about whether to pursue it is fundamentally Jason's decision (and ultimately a much broader political and constitutional decision). The note exists to capture the architectural thinking so it can inform future work without committing the platform to any specific position.

# Cross-References

This document is a research note in the platform's analytical framing folder. It does not modify any existing pillar substantiation, the master We The People Platform document, the Federal Fiscal Impact Analysis, the Pillars Borrow Independently document, or any other analytical content. It exists alongside the existing analytical content as a development direction document.

Related existing documents: 02_We_The_People_Platform.docx (master platform document; Pillar Seven Civic Infrastructure section is the most relevant existing content); 05_Civic_Infrastructure_Architectural_Framing.docx and 05_Physical_Civic_Infrastructure_Substantiation.docx (Pillar Seven framing and substantiation); 05_Federal_Fiscal_Impact_Analysis.docx (Pillar Seven funding via Federal Infrastructure Fee discussion); 05_Open_Issues_Registry.docx (Section 110 and 111 document the conversation that motivated this research note).