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COALITION MATHEMATICS

Threshold and Projection Analysis

How many supporters does the platform need?

How many would the per-citizen analysis project?

And what is the honest gap between projection and political reality?

An Analytical Framing Document

Jason Robertson

v1.0 · Created May 4, 2026 · Updated May 4, 2026

Ohio · 2026

Executive Summary

This document answers two related questions about the platform's political viability. First: what is the minimum supporter threshold the platform must clear to actually pass and survive? Not theoretically pass, but actually become law and remain in force across multiple election cycles. Second: what does the per-citizen benefit analysis project for supporter count, and what is the honest gap between that projection and likely political reality? The two questions matter together. Knowing the threshold is meaningless without an estimate of where the platform stands relative to it; knowing the projection is meaningless without acknowledging the gap to actual political support.

The Headline Numbers

Three different supporter thresholds matter, with different implications:

Threshold | Required Supporters | What it enables
Bare passage | ~78M voters (50%+1) | Single-cycle legislative passage with majorities
Durable mandate | ~93M voters (~55%) | Survives litigation and opposition mobilization
Filibuster-proof | ~110M voters (~60%) | 60 senators + clear House majority + president

The platform realistically requires the durable mandate threshold (approximately 93 million voters, or 55% of recent presidential turnout) to achieve passage and remain in force. Lower thresholds risk single-cycle reversal; higher thresholds are achievable but historically rare for legislation of this scope.

What the Per-Citizen Analysis Projects

The per-citizen benefit analysis identifies approximately 195 million Americans (about 81% of the adult population) in households that experience net positive impact at the Year 12 milestone, and approximately 5 million adults in households with net negative impact. If economic self-interest perfectly predicted political support, this would be a landslide. It does not.

Applying realistic benefit-to-support conversion rates derived from research on voter behavior — accounting for political ideology, identity, distrust of government, opposition messaging, and the substantial share of Americans who don't vote at all — the projected supporter count is approximately 78-95 million voters under realistic conditions, with substantial variance based on campaign quality, opposition response, and economic conditions during the campaign cycle.

The Honest Gap

Why the projection is much smaller than the natural beneficiary count • Voter turnout: only ~64% of eligible Americans vote in presidential elections. In 2024, approximately 90 million eligible Americans did not vote. Many net beneficiaries are among them. • Self-interest doesn't reliably predict voting: research consistently shows that voters weigh ideology, identity, cultural concerns, candidate qualities, and partisan affiliation alongside or above narrow economic interest. • Opposition mobilization: the top 1-2% has substantial resources to fund opposition messaging. Historical pattern: well-funded opposition can shift 8-15 percentage points in public support over a campaign cycle. • Distrust: even citizens who would benefit may not believe the platform will deliver, given decades of policy promises that didn't materialize. Trust is earned through delivery, not promises. • Identity-based voting: substantial share of Americans vote consistently with their party regardless of platform-specific economics. Recent shift of working-class voters toward Republicans illustrates this.

The Verdict

The platform's natural coalition is structurally large — approximately 81% of Americans live in households that benefit — but realistic political projection puts supporter count at the durable-mandate threshold in optimistic scenarios and below the threshold in pessimistic scenarios. The platform is politically viable but not a certainty. Passage requires effective citizen-facing communication (which the per-citizen analysis enables), sustained organizational effort across multiple election cycles, and political conditions that focus voter attention on economic structural issues rather than identity or cultural conflicts.

This is not a doom prediction. It is a sober projection. The platform's natural coalition exists and is large. Activating it to political reality is the work — the work this analysis estimates the size and shape of.

“The platform is politically viable but not a certainty. Passage requires effective citizen-facing communication, sustained organizational effort across multiple cycles, and political conditions that focus voter attention on economic structural issues.”

Minimum Supporter Thresholds

The platform's passage requires more than a single threshold being cleared. Multiple institutional thresholds must align. This section walks through each, identifies the binding constraint, and estimates the supporter count that constraint implies.

The Constitutional Architecture

The platform's legislation must clear several distinct institutional hurdles: presidential election (Electoral College, requiring 270 of 538 electoral votes), Senate (51 of 100 for simple majority; 60 for filibuster-proof; 67 for veto override), House of Representatives (218 of 435 for majority; 290 for veto override), and survive judicial review. Constitutional amendments require yet higher thresholds (two-thirds of both chambers plus three-quarters of state legislatures) but the platform's substantive commitments are statutory, not constitutional.

Among these institutional hurdles, the Senate filibuster has historically been the binding constraint for major progressive legislation. Bills with simple majority support in both chambers and a supportive president have been blocked by the filibuster repeatedly across recent decades. The platform's passage realistically requires either filibuster reform (a separate political project the platform itself doesn't address) or sufficient Senate support to bypass the filibuster.

Voter Threshold Calculation

Because the Senate's geographic representation (two senators per state regardless of population) means that 60 Senate seats can be controlled by a coalition of states representing as little as 38% of the US population, and because the Electoral College has its own state-weighted dynamics, voter threshold calculations are necessarily approximate. The estimates below assume reasonably normal political mapping where Senate and House majorities track presidential popular vote within several percentage points.

Threshold Type | Voter Count | % of 2024 Voters | Notes
Bare presidential majority (50%+1) | ~78M | 50% | Single-cycle, narrow
Senate simple majority + House | ~78M | 50% | Requires filibuster reform
Durable presidential mandate | ~85-93M | 55-60% | Survives one election cycle
Filibuster-proof Senate (60 seats) | ~93-110M | 60-70% | Without filibuster reform
Veto-override coalition | ~110-125M | 70-80% | Beyond presidential opposition
Constitutional amendment | ~125M+ | 80%+ | Not required for platform commitments

These figures are approximate and condition on relatively typical political mapping. In years with substantial geographic mismatch between popular vote and Electoral College or Senate composition, the voter counts can shift by 10-15% in either direction.

The Realistic Threshold: Durable Mandate

Of these thresholds, the durable mandate level (~85-93 million voters, ~55-60% of recent presidential turnout) is the realistic target for the platform. The reasoning:

Bare majorities don't survive. Legislation passed on 50%+1 margins in a single cycle is structurally vulnerable to repeal in the following cycle when the opposition wins back majority. The Affordable Care Act survived multiple repeal attempts only because Republicans could never quite unify their majorities behind a specific replacement; this was contingent on opposition disorganization, not platform popularity.

Filibuster reform is uncertain. Bypassing the Senate filibuster requires either 60 Senate seats (filibuster-proof majority) or majority-supported reform of Senate rules. Both have proven difficult historically. The platform's passage strategy must assume one of these is achievable, but neither is guaranteed.

Litigation will follow passage. Major legislation of this scope will face constitutional challenges, regulatory implementation disputes, and state-level resistance. Surviving litigation requires not just passage but durable public support that maintains political pressure on courts and regulators.

Veto-override is unrealistic to require. Requiring two-thirds majorities in both chambers (290 House + 67 Senate) is historically achieved only for very specific issues with strong bipartisan consensus. Treating this as a required threshold makes the platform impossible; treating it as a stretch goal that occurs in unusual conditions is realistic.

The platform's threshold is therefore approximately 85-93 million voters — a supermajority but not an overwhelming one. Achievable in principle; not certain in practice.

Comparison to Historical Precedent

For context, several historical legislation comparisons:

Legislation | Year | Approximate Public Support | Outcome
Social Security Act | 1935 | ~70% | Durable; expanded over decades
Medicare establishment | 1965 | ~65% | Durable; expanded
Civil Rights Act | 1964 | ~60% | Durable; resisted but maintained
Affordable Care Act | 2010 | ~50% | Vulnerable; survived narrowly
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act | 2017 | ~33% | Mostly durable; partial expirations
Inflation Reduction Act | 2022 | ~55% | Implementation contested
This platform (estimate) | 2026+ | Target: 55-60% | Goal: durable

The historical pattern is clear: legislation passed at 50% public support is vulnerable to repeal pressure; legislation passed at 60%+ tends to be durable. The platform's threshold target reflects this empirical reality.

“Legislation passed at 50% public support is structurally vulnerable. The platform's threshold target is the durable mandate level: approximately 85-93 million voters, or 55-60% of recent presidential turnout.”

Projected Supporter Count from Per-Citizen Analysis

If economic self-interest perfectly predicted political support, projecting supporter count would be straightforward arithmetic: count households that benefit, multiply by household size to get adults, apply turnout. Reality is more complex. This section walks through the projection at three layers of refinement: raw beneficiary count, household-to-voter conversion, and beneficiary-to-supporter conversion.

Layer 1: Raw Beneficiary Count

The per-citizen analysis (v2.5) established that bottom 80% of income distribution receives net positive impact at every milestone. Translating this to absolute population:

Group | Households | Adults (18+) | Net Impact | % of Adults
Bottom 80% by income | 105.6M | ~195M | Net positive | ~81%
Top 10-1% by income | 11.9M | ~22M | Mixed (modest positive) | ~9%
Top 1% by income (incl. wealth tax exposure) | 1.3M | ~2.5M | Net negative | ~1%
Top 0.1% (>$50M wealth) | 0.075M | ~0.15M | Strong net negative | ~0.06%
Other (mixed family situations, etc.) | 13.1M | ~21M | Variable | ~9%

On raw beneficiary count, the platform is structurally an overwhelming majority issue: approximately 195 million adults live in households that benefit, against approximately 5 million in households with net negative impact. The ratio is about 40-to-1. If political support followed economic self-interest, the platform would pass with ease.

Layer 2: Voter Turnout Application

Not all adults vote. Voter turnout in recent presidential elections has been approximately 64% of eligible voters. Applying turnout to the beneficiary breakdown:

Group | Adults (M) | Turnout Rate | Voters (M) | % of Voters
Bottom 80% beneficiaries | 195 | ~58% | ~113 | ~73%
Top 10-1% (mixed) | 22 | ~80% | ~17.6 | ~11%
Top 1% (net negative) | 2.5 | ~85% | ~2.1 | ~1.4%
Top 0.1% (strong negative) | 0.15 | ~90% | ~0.13 | ~0.08%
Other / mixed | 21 | ~60% | ~12.6 | ~8%
Total voters | 240.65 | ~64% | ~155 | 100%

Two patterns emerge from turnout application. First, the beneficiary share of voters drops from 81% of adults to 73% of voters — because higher-income households turn out at higher rates. Second, the cost-bearer share rises from approximately 1% of adults to about 1.5% of voters. Still overwhelming numerical advantage; the gap is now 50-to-1 rather than 40-to-1, but the structural imbalance is preserved.

Even with this turnout adjustment, the platform's projected base of voters who would benefit is approximately 113 million — well above all three threshold levels. If beneficiaries voted in proportion to their net interest, the platform passes overwhelmingly.

Layer 3: Benefit-to-Support Conversion

This is where the projection becomes substantially more uncertain. Research on voter behavior, electoral history, and recent political shifts demonstrates that economic self-interest is one factor among many in voting decisions. Translating ‘would benefit’ to ‘would actually vote for the platform’ requires application of realistic conversion rates.

What the research shows

Multiple lines of research inform realistic benefit-to-support conversion rates:

Empirical patterns in voter behavior • Working-class voters: between 2008 and 2024, the Democratic share of working-class voters dropped from approximately 60% to 49%, despite working-class economic interest typically aligning with Democratic platforms more than Republican platforms. The shift reflects ideology, identity, immigration, cultural issues, and distrust of institutions — not pure economic calculation. • Non-voters in 2024: approximately 89 million eligible Americans did not vote at all. Many of these are working-class and lower-income, populations the platform's per-citizen analysis identifies as net beneficiaries. They are beneficiaries who don't translate to voters at all. • Identity-based voting: research consistently shows that party affiliation, racial and religious identity, geographic identity, and cultural concerns drive voting alongside or above narrow economic calculation. The platform cannot assume beneficiaries who have other strong identity-based political commitments will switch based on economic interest. • Information asymmetry: many citizens don't know specific policy details. Even citizens who would benefit may not be aware they would benefit, or may believe opposition messaging that misrepresents the platform. • Trust deficit: decades of policy promises have produced cumulative skepticism. Even citizens convinced they would benefit may not believe the benefit will actually materialize. • Opposition resources: the top 1-2% of households (the platform's net cost-bearers) include substantial resources for opposition messaging. Historical campaigns have shown well-funded opposition can shift public support 8-15 percentage points over a cycle.

Realistic conversion rates by household type

Combining these factors, this analysis applies the following benefit-to-support conversion rates to project actual voter support:

Household Type | Net Benefit (Year 12) | Conversion Rate | Notes
Low-income family with kids | +$24,800/yr | 55-65% | Beneficiary, but turnout headwinds
Middle-income family with kids | +$22,400/yr | 55-65% | Mixed party affiliation; persuadable
Low-income single | +$8,200/yr | 50-60% | Lower turnout; identity factors
Middle-income single | +$7,800/yr | 50-60% | Highly variable by demographics
Retiree on fixed income | +$10,800/yr | 55-65% | High turnout; retirement security focus
Upper-middle family | +$13,500/yr | 40-55% | Some beneficiaries oppose for ideology
Top 10-1% (mixed) | Variable | 30-45% | Many oppose despite modest benefit
Top 1% (net negative) | -$22,500/yr | 10-25% | Some support out of altruism/civic concern
Top 0.1% (strong negative) | -$140,000+/yr | 5-15% | Substantial opposition resources

These conversion rates are honest estimates, not optimistic projections. Several specific notes:

Working-class beneficiaries (low-income family, low-income single): conversion rate is held substantially below 100% to reflect the empirical reality that working-class voters have shifted toward Republicans despite economic interests. Even with strong policy benefit, expecting 80%+ conversion is not realistic; 55-65% is the realistic upper bound under normal political conditions, with 50% achievable if campaign messaging is weak or opposition messaging is strong.

Top 1% net negatives: a non-trivial share (10-25%) is projected to support the platform despite negative economic impact, reflecting genuine altruism, civic concern about American direction, family interests (children and grandchildren who are beneficiaries), and rejection of extreme wealth concentration. This estimate is grounded in historical patterns where some wealthy Americans have supported progressive taxation and universal programs.

Upper-middle households: lower conversion rate than working-class beneficiaries despite positive economic impact, because this group has strong existing institutional attachments, often supports progressive social policy but opposes redistributive economic policy, and has access to opposition messaging through educational and professional networks.

Layer 3 Output: Projected Supporter Count

Scenario | Supporters (M) | % of Voters | Threshold Comparison
Pessimistic (low conversion, low turnout) | ~72M | ~46% | Below bare majority
Moderate (typical conversion, normal turnout) | ~85M | ~55% | Bare majority; durable mandate weak
Optimistic (high conversion, mobilized turnout) | ~98M | ~63% | Durable mandate; filibuster-proof unlikely
Maximum plausible | ~115M | ~74% | Filibuster-proof Senate possible

The projection range spans from just below the bare majority threshold (pessimistic) to durable mandate territory (moderate to optimistic), with maximum plausible reaching filibuster-proof but only under favorable conditions. The platform's political viability depends substantially on which scenario actually materializes during the campaign cycle.

“If beneficiaries voted in proportion to their net interest, the platform passes overwhelmingly. The projection range from 72M (pessimistic) to 115M (maximum) reflects the gap between economic self-interest and actual voting behavior. The work is closing that gap.”

Scenario Analysis

The projected supporter range (~72M to ~115M) is wide because the variables that determine which scenario materializes are political and contingent, not structural and predictable. This section walks through each scenario, identifies the conditions under which it occurs, and assesses the probability under realistic assumptions.

Pessimistic Scenario (~72M, ~46%)

Conditions: Voter turnout returns to typical mid-term levels (~60% rather than 64%). Conversion rates run at the low end of estimated ranges. Opposition messaging is well-funded and effective. Working-class voters who could benefit instead vote on identity, cultural concerns, or partisan affiliation. Substantial share of beneficiaries don't vote at all due to alienation or distrust. Platform messaging is technocratic rather than emotionally compelling.

What it produces: Approximately 72 million supporters. Below the bare majority threshold. Platform fails to pass at the federal level, though state-level versions may pass in receptive states. The work continues; the platform itself doesn't become law in this scenario.

Probability under realistic assumptions: Approximately 25-30%. Pessimistic scenarios occur when political conditions don't focus voter attention on economic structural issues, when opposition is well-organized, or when platform proponents fail to communicate effectively. None of these are unusual conditions; they describe much of recent American political history.

Moderate Scenario (~85M, ~55%)

Conditions: Voter turnout near 2024 levels (64% of eligible). Conversion rates run at midpoint of estimated ranges. Opposition messaging is present but not overwhelming. Working-class beneficiaries split roughly 55-45 in favor of platform. Younger voters and rural voters mobilize at higher rates than usual due to platform-specific benefits. Platform messaging includes per-citizen specifics rather than aggregate scale.

What it produces: Approximately 85 million supporters. At or just above the bare majority threshold; below durable mandate territory. Platform passes in narrow Senate and House majorities; survives initial passage but faces sustained repeal pressure across following election cycles. Implementation depends on whether subsequent administrations support or undermine the rollout.

Probability under realistic assumptions: Approximately 35-40%. Moderate scenarios are the most likely outcome under normal political conditions, where neither side has overwhelming advantages and the platform's natural coalition partially activates.

Optimistic Scenario (~98M, ~63%)

Conditions: Voter turnout above 2024 levels due to platform-specific mobilization (~67%+). Conversion rates run at the high end of estimated ranges. Effective platform messaging connects per-citizen specifics to citizen experience. Opposition messaging fails to gain traction or is undermined by economic conditions during campaign cycle (e.g., visible cost-of-living pressures that the platform addresses). Younger and working-class voters mobilize substantially. Some share of upper-middle and high-income voters support the platform out of civic concern or family interest.

What it produces: Approximately 98 million supporters. Reaches durable mandate territory. Platform passes with majorities sufficient to survive litigation and opposition repeal pressure. Implementation proceeds across multiple cycles. Filibuster-proof Senate (60 seats) is possible but not certain.

Probability under realistic assumptions: Approximately 25-30%. Optimistic scenarios require political conditions to align favorably and effective campaign organization. Both are achievable but not certain.

Maximum Plausible Scenario (~115M, ~74%)

Conditions: Major economic crisis or systemic disruption that focuses voter attention on platform-style structural reform (analogous to 1932-1936 Roosevelt mandate). Voter turnout substantially elevated. Cross-partisan support for specific platform commitments. Opposition fragmented or discredited. Multiple reinforcing election cycles.

What it produces: Approximately 115 million supporters. Filibuster-proof Senate possible. Veto-override coalitions for specific commitments. Platform passes with structural durability; implementation proceeds rapidly; opposition unable to block.

Probability under realistic assumptions: Approximately 5-10%. Maximum plausible scenarios require unusual political conditions. They occur, but treating them as expected is unrealistic.

Probability-Weighted Projection

Combining scenarios with their probabilities:

Scenario | Supporters | Probability | Weighted
Pessimistic | 72M | 27.5% | 19.8M
Moderate | 85M | 37.5% | 31.9M
Optimistic | 98M | 27.5% | 27.0M
Maximum plausible | 115M | 7.5% | 8.6M
Expected supporters |  |  | ~87M

The probability-weighted expected supporter count is approximately 87 million voters, or approximately 56% of recent presidential turnout. This is just at the lower edge of durable mandate territory — enough to pass, not enough to be certain of survival across cycles. The expected outcome is a viable but precarious passage rather than a structurally durable mandate.

“Expected supporters: ~87 million voters (~56%). Just at the durable mandate threshold. Enough to pass, not enough to be certain of survival across cycles. Viable but precarious.”

Sensitivities and Drivers

The supporter count projection has substantial sensitivity to several variables that the platform's proponents can influence and others that they cannot. Understanding which is which informs strategy.

Variables the Platform Can Influence

Within proponent control • Per-citizen messaging effectiveness: shifting from aggregate federal numbers to per-household specifics can substantially raise conversion rates. The v2.5 Per-Citizen Benefits and Costs document is specifically designed to enable this shift. • Coalition organization: sustained organizational investment in voter education, registration, and turnout mobilization can shift conversion rates by 3-7 percentage points. Historical precedent: the Obama 2008 and 2012 campaigns achieved this kind of mobilization shift. • Candidate quality and platform clarity: clear, consistent messaging from credible spokespeople moves swing voters substantially. Conversely, unclear or inconsistent messaging leaves the natural coalition vulnerable to opposition framing. • Coalition breadth: explicit cross-partisan elements that engage some center-right voters (e.g., emphasis on family financial security, retirement security) can broaden the coalition. The platform's per-citizen architecture supports this naturally; messaging must follow. • Implementation credibility: demonstrating implementation capability (through state-level pilots, prior policy track records, detailed substantiation work) builds the trust that converts skeptical beneficiaries to active supporters.

Variables the Platform Cannot Control

Outside proponent control • Economic conditions during campaign cycles: voters in good economic conditions tend toward incumbents; voters in deteriorating conditions tend toward change-oriented platforms. The platform benefits from cycles where existing arrangements are visibly failing. • Major exogenous events: wars, pandemics, financial crises, and other major events reshape voter priorities in ways that may help or hurt the platform's prospects. • Opposition campaign quality: well-funded, well-organized opposition can shift public support 8-15 percentage points over a cycle. The platform faces well-resourced opposition (top 1-2% by wealth) regardless of campaign quality. • Media coverage and information environment: how the platform is framed by news media, social media platforms, and opinion leaders substantially shapes public perception. This is partially influenced by proponent communication but not controlled. • Cultural and identity politics: voters often respond to identity-based appeals over economic appeals. The platform can address economic interests directly but cannot fully overcome identity-based political alignments.

Sensitivity Estimates

Approximate impact of key variables on supporter count, holding others constant:

Variable | Range | Supporter Count Impact
Voter turnout (60% to 68%) | +/- 4pp | +/- 6-9 million supporters
Working-class conversion (50% to 70%) | +/- 10pp | +/- 12-18 million supporters
Middle-income conversion (50% to 65%) | +/- 7.5pp | +/- 8-12 million supporters
Opposition messaging effectiveness | Strong/weak | +/- 8-15 million supporters
Economic conditions during campaign | Strong/weak | +/- 5-10 million supporters
Per-citizen messaging quality | Strong/weak | +/- 5-10 million supporters
Platform candidate quality | Strong/weak | +/- 4-8 million supporters

Working-class conversion rate is the highest-leverage variable. Shifting working-class beneficiary support from 50% to 65% adds approximately 15 million supporters — enough to move from the moderate scenario to the optimistic scenario. This is also the variable where empirical research suggests the largest gap between economic self-interest and actual political behavior, meaning the largest opportunity for effective platform messaging.

The Critical Path

The platform's path to durable mandate (85-93M supporters) requires hitting most of these:

Critical path requirements • Voter turnout at or above 2024 levels (~64%) — platform-specific mobilization in working-class and rural areas in particular. • Working-class beneficiary conversion above 60% — substantially better than 2024 baseline; requires effective economic messaging that competes with identity-based political alignment. • Middle-income family conversion above 60% — the platform's per-citizen analysis particularly targets families with kids; messaging must follow. • Top 10-1% conversion above 40% — a meaningful share of upper-middle households support out of civic concern or family interest; messaging that engages this group is achievable. • Effective neutralization of opposition messaging on at least one major dimension (e.g., wealth tax framing, government efficiency, implementation credibility). • Sustained organizational effort across at least two election cycles — not a single-cycle effort but a multi-year coalition building process.

Hitting all six is not certain. Hitting most of them puts the platform at the durable mandate threshold. Missing several puts it in pessimistic scenario territory.

“Working-class conversion rate is the highest-leverage variable. The largest gap between economic self-interest and actual political behavior. The largest opportunity for effective platform messaging.”

Honest Acknowledgments

This document projects supporter count based on per-citizen benefit analysis, voter turnout patterns, and benefit-to-support conversion rates derived from empirical research on voter behavior. The numbers are honest projections, not predictions. Several specific acknowledgments warrant explicit treatment.

Conversion Rates Are Estimates, Not Certainties

The benefit-to-support conversion rates applied in this analysis are derived from research on voter behavior, exit poll patterns, and historical campaign outcomes. They are estimates of what's likely under typical political conditions; they are not predictions of what will happen in any specific cycle. Conversion rates can shift substantially based on candidate quality, campaign messaging, opposition response, exogenous events, and media coverage. The supporter count projections should therefore be interpreted as ranges with substantial uncertainty, not point estimates.

Self-Interest Doesn't Reliably Predict Voting

This is the central honest acknowledgment of this document. The per-citizen analysis (v2.5) demonstrated that approximately 81% of Americans live in households that benefit from the platform. If economic self-interest reliably predicted political support, this would translate to overwhelming political support. It does not. Voters consistently weigh ideology, identity, cultural concerns, candidate qualities, and partisan affiliation alongside or above narrow economic interest. The 2024 election demonstrated this pattern clearly: working-class voters who would benefit from progressive economic platforms voted Republican at higher rates than at any point since the 1980s.

This means the platform's natural coalition is real but not automatic. Activating it requires effective communication, sustained organization, and political conditions that focus voter attention on economic structural issues. None of these are guaranteed.

Opposition Will Be Well-Funded

The platform's net cost-bearers (top 1-2% by wealth) include substantial resources for opposition messaging, lobbying, litigation, and political organization. Historical patterns suggest well-funded opposition can shift public support by 8-15 percentage points over a campaign cycle. The supporter projections in this document include adjustment for typical opposition activity; they do not include adjustment for unusually well-funded or unusually effective opposition campaigns. In adverse opposition scenarios, the projected supporter count could fall 5-10 million below the moderate scenario estimate.

Some Beneficiaries Will Oppose

Multiple research lines confirm that a substantial share of net beneficiaries will oppose the platform. Reasons include: ideological commitment to small government regardless of personal benefit, identity-based political alignment that overrides economic interest, distrust that benefits will actually materialize, opposition to specific platform components that override support for others, and cultural concerns that the platform cannot directly address. The conversion rates applied in this analysis explicitly acknowledge this; they are below 100% even for net beneficiaries.

Some Cost-Bearers Will Support

Conversely, a non-trivial share of net cost-bearers (top 1% and even top 0.1%) will support the platform out of altruism, civic concern, family interest in next-generation outcomes, or genuine commitment to addressing wealth concentration. The conversion rates for top 1% (10-25%) and top 0.1% (5-15%) are non-zero specifically to reflect this empirical reality. Historical patterns include wealthy Americans who supported progressive taxation, universal social programs, and labor rights despite personal economic costs.

Geographic Concentration Matters

Supporter count projections in this document are based on national totals. Actual political viability depends substantially on geographic distribution: where supporters live determines Senate seats, House districts, and Electoral College votes. A national popular vote majority for the platform that's geographically concentrated in coastal metropolitan areas may not translate to Senate majorities or Electoral College victory. The platform's coalition strategy must therefore include geographic breadth, not just numerical majority.

This is a particular concern given the structural over-representation of small-population states in the Senate and Electoral College. A 55% national popular vote majority might translate to a 50-50 Senate or even minority Senate seats depending on geographic distribution. The platform's path to passage requires not just numerical supporters but geographically distributed supporters.

Multi-Cycle Effort Required

Major legislation of this scope is not passed in a single election cycle through a single campaign. Historical comparisons (Social Security 1935, Medicare 1965, ACA 2010) all reflect multi-cycle organizational effort that built durable coalitions before legislative passage. The platform's projections in this document treat passage as a single-cycle event for simplicity, but actual political viability requires sustained organizational effort across at least 2-3 election cycles. The supporter count needed to be activated to actual voting may need to be substantially larger than the supporter count needed at the moment of legislative passage, because some attrition is normal across multi-cycle campaigns.

This Analysis Cannot Predict the Future

Most fundamentally, this analysis projects what's likely under typical political conditions; it cannot predict what will happen. Specific election outcomes depend on candidate quality, campaign organization, media environment, exogenous events, and political conditions that cannot be forecast years in advance. The supporter count projections in this document should be interpreted as analytical inputs to strategy, not as predictions of outcomes. The platform's proponents must do the work of building the coalition; this analysis estimates what that work consists of and what scale it must achieve.

“The platform's natural coalition is real but not automatic. Activating it requires effective communication, sustained organization, and political conditions that focus voter attention on economic structural issues. None of these are guaranteed.”

Strategic Implications

The threshold and projection analysis has direct implications for how the platform's proponents should organize, communicate, and prioritize. This section walks through them.

Communication Priorities

The single highest-leverage activity for shifting projection from pessimistic toward optimistic is per-citizen messaging that connects platform commitments to specific household impact. The v2.5 Per-Citizen Benefits and Costs document is built specifically to enable this. Communication priorities follow:

Communication priority order • Lead with per-citizen specifics: a working-class household saving $24,800/year is more compelling than a $3.2 trillion healthcare program. The aggregate number is for analysts; the per-citizen number is for voters. • Match the messaging to the audience: families with children hear childcare savings; retirees hear retirement security; rural Americans hear broadband universal access; healthcare-burdened households hear healthcare savings. • Acknowledge costs honestly: voters distrust messaging that promises only benefits. The platform's progressive funding architecture is its strength, not a weakness to hide. Wealthy households contribute more; this is the platform's design. • Address distrust directly: many beneficiaries don't believe the benefit will materialize. Implementation track record, substantiation depth, and credible delivery mechanisms address this; messaging must follow. • Build cross-coalition appeal: family financial security, retirement security, and rural access all have appeal across partisan lines. Lead with these where audiences include partisan opponents.

Organizational Priorities

Beyond messaging, organizational effort determines whether natural beneficiaries activate to actual supporters:

Voter education. Substantial share of natural beneficiaries don't know they would benefit. Voter education materials — specifically the per-citizen documents, simplified into accessible formats — close information gaps that opposition messaging exploits.

Voter registration. Approximately 89 million eligible Americans didn't vote in 2024. Disproportionately working-class, lower-income, younger, and rural — demographically the platform's natural coalition. Registration and turnout efforts are high-leverage.

Coalition organization. Standalone candidates running on platform-style commitments are vulnerable to opposition framing. Organized coalitions — labor unions, community organizations, advocacy groups, professional associations — build durability that individual candidates cannot.

Multi-cycle commitment. Single-cycle campaigns may achieve narrow majorities but rarely durable mandates. The platform's threshold analysis suggests passage requires sustained organizational effort across at least two election cycles, with continued coalition maintenance after initial passage.

Candidate Selection

The supporter count projection has implications for what kinds of candidates the platform's proponents should support:

Working-class authenticity. Working-class beneficiaries are the highest-leverage demographic. Candidates who can credibly speak to working-class concerns — not just on economic platform but on identity, cultural concerns, and credibility — substantially raise conversion rates. Candidates who appear to dismiss working-class concerns systematically lose this demographic regardless of platform substance.

Cross-coalition viability. Candidates who can appeal across partisan lines on specific platform commitments — family financial security, retirement security, rural access — broaden the coalition beyond partisan baseline. Candidates who appear partisan-coded face structural ceilings.

Implementation credibility. Voters distrust promises without delivery records. Candidates with track records of policy delivery in lower offices, business success in relevant areas, or community organization leadership build the trust that converts skeptical beneficiaries to active supporters. First-time political candidates without delivery records face higher conversion barriers.

State-Level Strategy

Federal-level passage is the platform's primary target, but state-level strategy is supporting infrastructure:

State-level pilots demonstrate implementation capability — e.g., universal healthcare experiments at state level, broadband cooperative deployment, childcare expansion. Successful state-level pilots build implementation credibility that supports federal-level passage. Failed pilots provide ammunition to federal-level opposition.

State-level adoptions of partial platform commitments build coalition infrastructure. State-level minimum wage increases, healthcare expansions, and childcare programs build organizational capacity, voter networks, and political track records that support federal-level work.

State-level wins also matter independently. If federal-level passage is delayed by political conditions, state-level versions of platform commitments deliver real benefits to citizens in receptive states. The platform's per-citizen benefits do not require federal passage to begin materializing; they require federal passage for full universal deployment.

The Honest Bottom Line

The platform's natural coalition is structurally large but politically inactive. Activating it to political reality is the work. The supporter count projection of approximately 87 million voters (probability-weighted expected outcome) sits just at the durable mandate threshold — enough to pass but not enough to be certain of survival across cycles. The platform is politically viable but not a certainty.

This is neither doom nor optimism. It is honest projection. The platform's proponents who internalize this analysis will not be surprised by either outcome — successful passage with sustained organizational effort, or failure to activate the natural coalition under adverse political conditions. Both scenarios are possible. Which scenario materializes depends substantially on the work the platform's proponents do between now and the campaign cycles ahead.

The platform's per-citizen analysis (v2.5) gave proponents the citizen-facing arithmetic that makes coalition mobilization tractable. This document gives proponents the threshold and projection analysis that makes coalition strategy specific. Together they convert the platform's analytical depth into political possibility.

“The platform is politically viable but not a certainty. The supporter count projection of approximately 87 million voters sits just at the durable mandate threshold. Enough to pass but not enough to be certain of survival across cycles.”

Jason Robertson

Ohio, May 4, 2026