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BUILDING CAPACITY

for the Problems We Cannot Yet See

A Future Capacity Fund

Two Architectural Paths Forward

An Architectural Addition to the We The People Platform

Jason Robertson

v1.0 · Created April 2026 · Updated May 3, 2026

Ohio · 2026

The Principle

The platform addresses problems we can see now: retirement insecurity, wage stagnation, educational inaccessibility, healthcare costs, childcare costs, mental health gaps, Civic Infrastructure decay, AI workforce displacement. Each pillar is built on analytical work that demonstrates the problem is tractable. This is the right approach for visible problems.

Future generations will face problems we cannot currently see. Some will be technological. AI is the obvious current example, but the next decades will produce challenges that aren’t yet on anyone’s radar. Some will be biological. Pandemic preparedness, antibiotic resistance, public health threats unfamiliar to current institutions. Some will be environmental. Climate adaptation requirements that current modeling underestimates. Some will be geopolitical. The international order that has organized the past eighty years is unlikely to organize the next eighty in the same way.

Each of these unforeseeable challenges will require institutional capacity to respond. That capacity must exist before the problem arrives. Building capacity reactively after a problem has emerged means accepting that the problem’s damage compounds during the years required to construct the institutional response. Building capacity in advance preserves the country’s ability to respond at the moment response is needed.

This document proposes adding a Future Capacity Fund to the platform’s architecture. The fund accumulates over time under the same governance principles that protect the other pillars. It is available for deployment when future generations identify problems requiring institutional response at scale. Solutions drawing from the fund must adhere to the platform’s principles. Decisions to deploy the fund require explicit, documented, supermajority legislative authorization.

The mechanism is not novel. Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global preserves wealth across generations against problems future Norwegians will face. Singapore’s GIC operates similarly. What this document proposes is applying the same architecture explicitly within the American context, as part of the platform’s broader infrastructure. The platform’s architecture already demonstrates how institutional capacity gets built. Extending that demonstrated capacity from solving known problems to preserving capacity for unknown ones fits cleanly with the platform’s principles.

“The most important infrastructure is often the infrastructure we don’t need yet. By the time we need it, building it is too late.”

Shared Architectural Elements

Both proposed paths share several architectural elements. These are described first because the paths differ only in specific design choices, not in their fundamental principles.

Procedural Rather Than Substantive Constraints

The fund’s authorizing legislation specifies the *process* by which deployment decisions are made, not the *substance* of what the fund can be used for. This is the central architectural choice. Defining the fund’s permitted uses substantively would lock in current assumptions about future problems, which defeats the purpose of preserving capacity for unforeseen challenges. Defining the fund’s deployment process precisely while leaving the substance open allows future generations to address problems that current generations cannot anticipate, while protecting the fund against political raiding for foreseeable purposes.

Required Conditions for Deployment

Any proposed deployment of the fund must satisfy explicit conditions. The problem being addressed must be identified at population scale. Existing institutional capacity must be demonstrated inadequate to address the problem. The proposed solution must adhere to the platform’s principles: pooled contribution where applicable, empirical anchoring, transparent governance, structural fraud prevention. Supermajority legislative approval is required to authorize deployment. Sunset clauses on any specific deployment ensure that funds deployed for one purpose cannot become permanent dependencies that prevent future deployment for other purposes.

Insulation From Political Raiding

The supermajority requirement is the central insulation mechanism. A simple majority can pass current legislation. A supermajority requirement to deploy reserved capacity ensures that deployment requires broad political consensus rather than narrow partisan majorities. This protects the fund from the dynamic that has degraded similar institutions in other contexts — whichever coalition holds power working to redirect reserved capacity toward its current priorities. The fund is available to address genuine problems that achieve broad political recognition. It is unavailable for partisan deployment regardless of which faction holds power.

Transparent Governance

The fund is governed by an independent board with staggered terms, transparent reporting requirements, and statutory firewalls against political direction — the same governance principles that protect the Sovereign Fund’s retirement and education functions. Quarterly reports document the fund’s holdings, performance, and any deployment activity. Any proposed deployment is debated publicly with full documentation of the problem being addressed, the proposed solution, and the justification for deployment.

These shared architectural elements apply to both paths described below. The paths differ only in the specific design choices about funding mechanisms, deployment scope, and timing. The underlying principle of preserving capacity for unknown future problems, under transparent governance with supermajority deployment authorization, is consistent across both paths.

Path A: Pure Future Capacity Fund

The first path is purely future-oriented. The fund accumulates indefinitely with no scheduled deployment. Its purpose is exclusively to preserve capacity for problems that future generations will identify and define. Decisions about whether to deploy the fund are made by the generations facing the problems, not by current generations attempting to anticipate future needs.

Funding Mechanisms

Several mechanisms can fund this path without competing with the existing pillars. Each is structurally separable from the platform’s core funding architecture.

A small percentage of the Sovereign Fund’s annual returns. Half a percent of annual returns, redirected from the retirement system to the Future Capacity Fund, would accumulate substantially over time. The mechanism is similar to how Alaska’s Permanent Fund directs a portion of returns to specific purposes while preserving principal. The retirement system’s mathematical projections accommodate this redirection without meaningfully affecting individual retirement outcomes, because the retirement system’s own returns include conservative assumptions that absorb the redirection.

Surplus returns above expected returns. The Sovereign Fund’s projections assume 6% real returns. In years when actual returns exceed that level, the excess could automatically flow to the Future Capacity Fund rather than to the retirement system. This produces no expected reduction in retirement security because retirement projections already assume the conservative return level. Years of strong market performance build future capacity. Years of weak performance leave retirement security intact.

Specific revenue streams that don’t fit naturally into other pillars. Carbon pricing revenue, financial transaction taxes, wealth taxes on extreme accumulations, or proceeds from federal asset disposals could be directed to the Future Capacity Fund rather than to general revenue. These mechanisms are politically separable from the platform’s core pillars but produce capital aligned with the future capacity purpose. They tie current decisions about specific policy issues to investment in future generations’ capacity to address their own challenges.

Periodic universal contribution renewals. The Founding Stake mechanism establishes the principle of universal contribution at platform launch. The principle could be repeated at intervals — perhaps every twenty-five years — as a constitutional renewal moment that adds to the Future Capacity Fund. Each generation would have its own opportunity to contribute to the institution they inherit, becoming founding stakeholders in their own right rather than only inheritors of previous generations’ contributions.

Strengths of Path A

Path A is the cleaner architecture. The fund’s purpose is unambiguous. It accumulates capacity for unknown future problems. Decisions about deployment are deferred until the problems become visible. Current generations cannot raid the fund for current priorities, because the fund is not designed to address current priorities. Future generations inherit institutional capacity rather than current generations’ best guesses about what they will need.

The political defense of Path A is straightforward. The fund exists because no one knows what problems will emerge over the next century. The same uncertainty that motivates the fund’s creation protects the fund from being raided for foreseeable purposes. Anyone arguing that the fund should be deployed for a specific current priority is implicitly arguing that current generations can foresee future needs better than future generations themselves — a position that’s difficult to defend honestly.

Limitations of Path A

The pure future capacity approach produces no visible benefits during the buildup period. The fund accumulates for decades before any deployment. Citizens contributing to the fund through tax or surplus mechanisms see no return on those contributions during their own lifetimes, except in the abstract sense that they’re building capacity for their descendants. This produces a political durability problem. Funds that produce no visible benefits are vulnerable to political pressure to redirect them toward priorities that do produce visible benefits.

The deferred deployment also means that when future problems do emerge, the institutional infrastructure for deploying the fund must be built reactively. The fund’s governance can be established now, but the operational capacity to deploy funds against specific problems requires development at the moment of need. Some of this lag is unavoidable. Some of it could be reduced by occasional deployment that exercises the fund’s operational capacity.

Path A is the architecturally pure version. Future capacity is preserved without compromise. The political durability question — whether the fund survives across the decades required for it to mature — is genuine and deserves explicit consideration.

Path B: Hybrid Future Capacity and Demonstration Fund

The second path combines future capacity with current demonstration. The fund accumulates with the same long-term mandate as Path A, but with a small portion available for testing platform components at less-than-national scale. A pilot universal childcare program in one or two states. A wage floor implementation in selected industries. A voter access infrastructure project in a specific region. Each demonstration generates evidence about how the platform’s principles work in practice.

How the Hybrid Architecture Works

The hybrid fund is structured with two distinct pools. The core pool accumulates indefinitely under the Path A mandate. Deployment requires supermajority legislative authorization and addresses problems future generations identify. This pool grows continuously and is the long-term insurance the fund’s broader purpose requires.

The demonstration pool is a smaller component of the fund, capped at a defined percentage of the core pool’s balance. Demonstration pool deployments fund proof-of-concept implementations of platform components in specific geographies, industries, or populations. These deployments require different authorization than core pool deployments — simple majority approval rather than supermajority — but operate under explicit constraints that prevent them from consuming capacity that should be preserved for the core mandate.

Constraints on the Demonstration Pool

Several constraints protect the core mandate from being consumed by demonstration activity. The demonstration pool cannot exceed five percent of the core pool’s balance. Each demonstration project has a maximum funding cap and a maximum duration. Demonstrations sunset automatically at completion of their planned period regardless of outcome. Funds returned from completed demonstrations flow back to the core pool, not to extended demonstrations or new programs. No demonstration can transition into permanent operation funded by the demonstration pool — if a demonstration succeeds and warrants permanent implementation, that implementation must be funded through normal legislative authorization with its own dedicated funding mechanism.

The demonstration pool’s purpose is specifically to generate evidence about how platform principles work in practice. Demonstrations of universal childcare in selected states generate evidence about workforce capacity, parent satisfaction, and economic effects. Demonstrations of wage floors in specific industries generate evidence about employment effects and price pass-through. Demonstrations of voter access infrastructure in specific regions generate evidence about turnout effects and administrative feasibility. The evidence supports later legislative decisions about full national implementation.

Strengths of Path B

The hybrid path produces visible benefits within the first decade. State-level pilots of platform components generate concrete evidence that supporters can point to and that skeptics can engage with. The political durability question that affects Path A is partially addressed by the visible activity of demonstration projects. Citizens who see platform principles working in practice in their own states or industries are more likely to support permanent national implementation than citizens who can only argue about platform principles in the abstract.

The hybrid path also produces operational capacity for the core fund’s deployment. Federal infrastructure for managing demonstration projects — administrative oversight, performance evaluation, financial controls — is the same infrastructure that would be required for core pool deployments. Building this infrastructure through demonstration activity rather than waiting until core pool deployment becomes necessary reduces the operational lag when future problems do emerge.

The hybrid path provides a mechanism for refining platform components before national implementation. Some platform components may work as designed at national scale. Others may require modifications that only become visible during smaller-scale implementation. Demonstrations identify these refinement needs before national stakes are high.

Limitations of Path B

The hybrid path is more politically vulnerable than Path A. The demonstration pool is a target for political pressure to expand its scope, fund favored projects, or transition successful demonstrations into permanent programs funded by the pool. The five percent cap and the constraints on demonstration deployments are protections against these pressures, but the protections must be enforced consistently across decades by governance institutions that may face changing political pressures.

The hybrid path also creates more complex governance requirements. The fund must distinguish between core pool decisions (supermajority authorization for unforeseen future problems) and demonstration pool decisions (simple majority authorization for current platform component testing). Boundary cases will require interpretation. Whether a particular proposed deployment is genuinely a demonstration or is a back-door deployment of the core pool will require judgment that politically motivated actors may try to influence.

Finally, the hybrid path’s benefits during the buildup period may produce expectations that the core pool will continue to produce visible benefits at later stages. This expectation could pressure later generations to deploy the core pool for current priorities rather than preserving it for genuinely unforeseen future problems. The architectural integrity of the future capacity mandate could erode over time under this pressure.

Path B trades architectural purity for political durability. The benefits during buildup strengthen the fund’s political defense. The complexity of the hybrid architecture creates new vulnerabilities. Reasonable people can weigh these tradeoffs differently.

Comparing the Two Paths

Both paths are coherent. Both implement the same underlying principle of preserving capacity for unknown future problems under transparent governance with supermajority deployment authorization. They differ in specific design choices that produce different tradeoffs.

Architectural Purity

Path A is architecturally pure. The fund has one purpose, one set of governance rules, and one deployment mechanism. There is no ambiguity about what the fund is for or how it should be used. The clarity of the architecture is itself a defense against political capture, because any proposed deployment can be evaluated against an unambiguous standard.

Path B is architecturally complex. The fund has two purposes (future capacity and current demonstration), two sets of governance rules (supermajority and simple majority), and two deployment mechanisms (core pool and demonstration pool). The complexity creates more decision points where governance can be contested or eroded. The architectural complexity is the cost of producing visible benefits during the buildup period.

Political Durability

Path A is more vulnerable during the buildup period because it produces no visible benefits. Citizens, journalists, and political opponents may argue that funds accumulating without producing benefits should be redirected to current priorities. The argument is wrong on the architectural merits, but the political pressure it produces is real.

Path B addresses the buildup-period vulnerability through visible demonstration activity. Citizens see platform principles working in their states. Journalists report on demonstration outcomes. Political defenders can point to concrete evidence rather than only to abstract principles. The political durability is stronger during the buildup period.

Path B may be more vulnerable in later periods, however. The pattern of visible benefits established during buildup could produce expectations that benefits continue, which could pressure later generations to deploy the core pool inappropriately. Path A’s lack of buildup-period benefits could be a long-term advantage if it establishes the expectation that the fund’s purpose is genuinely future-oriented.

Operational Readiness

Path A produces operational capacity reactively when deployment becomes necessary. The fund’s governance is established now, but the administrative infrastructure for deploying funds against specific problems must be developed when the problem emerges. Some lag is unavoidable. Whether the lag is significant depends on the urgency of future problems and the speed at which institutions can be built.

Path B produces operational capacity continuously through demonstration activity. The infrastructure for evaluating, funding, and overseeing programs is in active use, which means it exists in mature form when core pool deployment becomes necessary. The reduced operational lag is a meaningful advantage for problems that emerge with little warning.

Evidence Generation

Path A generates no evidence about how platform principles work in practice during the buildup period. Platform implementation depends on the analytical work documented in the white papers and Excel models, supplemented by international comparisons. This evidence is substantial but is not American-specific.

Path B generates American-specific evidence through state-level pilots. The evidence supports later national-scale legislative decisions and refinements to platform components before they reach full implementation. Demonstrations of universal childcare in Vermont and Oregon, for example, would produce evidence about how the program operates in different state contexts that the international evidence cannot fully replicate.

Recommendation

This document does not make a recommendation between the paths. Both are coherent. Each has genuine strengths and genuine limitations. The choice between them depends on judgments about political durability, the importance of evidence generation during the buildup period, and the willingness to accept architectural complexity in exchange for political defensibility.

My own intuition is that Path B is probably stronger for the platform’s actual political circumstances. The platform faces a long path from current concept to national implementation. Visible demonstrations during that path strengthen the case for full implementation. The architectural complexity is real but tractable with sufficient governance design. Other thoughtful readers may reasonably reach different conclusions, and the choice is one the platform’s broader political coalition should make collectively rather than the author imposing.

Either path could be implemented. Both produce institutional capacity that addresses the underlying need. The most important commitment is to preserving capacity for problems future generations will face, regardless of which specific architectural path implements that commitment.

“The choice is not whether the country prepares for unforeseen problems. The country either prepares or doesn’t. The choice between Path A and Path B is about how to prepare, not whether to.”

What Has Not Been Worked Out

This document introduces the Future Capacity Fund at concept level. Substantial work remains before either path can be implemented.

The funding mechanism analysis has not been completed. The four mechanisms described above (Sovereign Fund returns, surplus returns, dedicated revenue streams, and periodic universal contributions) each require specific analysis of how much capital they would generate, how the generation would scale over time, and how they would interact with the platform’s other funding mechanisms. The combined funding architecture for either path requires explicit modeling that has not yet been done.

The governance design requires development. The independent board’s composition, term lengths, and statutory protections must be specified. The relationship between the fund’s governance and the broader Sovereign Fund’s governance must be defined. The specific supermajority threshold for deployment authorization must be set — two-thirds, three-fifths, or some other level — with explicit reasoning for the choice. The conditions that demonstration pool deployments must satisfy under Path B require detailed specification.

The investment policy must be designed. The fund’s long time horizon and uncertain deployment timing produce different investment requirements than the retirement Sovereign Fund. The asset allocation, rebalancing rules, and risk management approach require expert input from investment professionals who specialize in long-horizon institutional funds. The international comparables (Norway GPFG, Singapore GIC, Australia Future Fund) provide reference points but require adaptation to American legal and political circumstances.

The constitutional questions require analysis. Specific funding mechanisms (carbon pricing, financial transaction taxes, wealth taxes) face their own constitutional questions. The supermajority deployment requirement faces questions about congressional rule-making authority. Periodic universal contributions face questions similar to the original Founding Stake analysis. None of these questions are insurmountable, but each requires legal architecture more developed than this concept document provides.

This pillar is positioned at concept level. The architectural intent is clear. The implementation specifics are work that subsequent revisions would need to complete. The current document captures the principle and the architectural options without overstating what has been worked out.

Closing

The platform’s primary pillars solve problems we can see. The adjacent pillars address problems we can see but haven’t fully analyzed. The Future Capacity Fund addresses problems we cannot yet see at all. Each level of certainty about future problems requires its own institutional response.

The architecture proposed here adapts the platform’s broader principles to the specific challenge of preserving capacity for unforeseeable problems. The mechanism is not novel — several countries operate similar funds successfully. What is novel in the American context is integrating future capacity preservation into a comprehensive policy platform alongside the institutional responses to current problems.

Two paths are offered because reasonable people can weigh the relevant tradeoffs differently. Path A preserves architectural purity at the cost of political durability during buildup. Path B trades architectural purity for political durability and evidence generation. Both are coherent. Both serve the underlying purpose. The choice between them is a choice about how to implement the principle, not about whether to implement it.

The work that remains is substantial. The architectural intent is clear. Either path could be developed to full implementation given sufficient analytical work and political coalition-building. This document is offered as the starting point for that development, with explicit acknowledgment that the development has not yet occurred.

“What we build for ourselves becomes what our descendants inherit. What we preserve for them becomes what they can build with. Both kinds of construction matter. Neither one substitutes for the other.”

Jason Robertson

Ohio, 2026