← We The People Platform Download .docx

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

AND UPTAKE FRICTION

How Real Households Engage With Universal Programs

What does the platform's mathematical optimism assume about human behavior?

Where will real households fall short of those assumptions?

How does the platform's design protect against — or fail to protect against — predictable friction?

An Analytical Framing Document

Jason Robertson

v1.1 · Created May 5, 2026 for v2.14 · Updated May 6, 2026 for v2.19.1 (heading normalization)

Ohio · 2026

Sources Baseline. Numerical claims in this document derive from the canonical sources cataloged in 05_Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx. Platform-canonical contribution rates are documented in the Open Issues Registry under OPEN-1; the 4.8 percent combined contribution figure aggregates the platform's adjacent-pillar employee-share rates as cataloged. Behavioral economics research citations follow the convention of naming the specific study at point of use; aggregate population-level figures derive from BLS and Census denominators.

The Question This Document Addresses

The platform's mathematical models — the Combined Reform Model, the Per-Citizen Cost Benefit Model, the Federal Fiscal Impact Analysis, and the citizen-facing comparison tables — implicitly assume that eligible households engage with the platform's programs as designed. They assume people enroll in universal healthcare when it becomes available. They assume the wage floor exemption is correctly applied to every working household's federal income tax. They assume the Refundable Transition Bridge Credit reaches every household whose net position would otherwise worsen. They assume people understand the changes well enough to advocate for the platform politically and not be successfully turned against it by misinformation.

Thirty years of behavioral economics research suggests these assumptions are systematically wrong. The pattern is consistent across program after program: a meaningful fraction of eligible households fail to engage with benefits they qualify for, even when those benefits are substantial and the application process is comparatively simple. The Earned Income Tax Credit, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicaid, the Children's Health Insurance Program, and the Affordable Care Act marketplaces all show non-trivial uptake gaps among eligible households despite decades of outreach effort. The platform inherits this risk and does not currently quantify it.

This document examines the platform from a behavioral economics perspective. It identifies where the platform's design protects against predictable friction, where it remains exposed, and what the consequences are if uptake is materially less than the mathematical models assume. It then considers loss aversion and political viability — the question of how the transition lands psychologically for households who would benefit from the platform but may experience the changes as risky or threatening. The analysis is qualitative and architectural rather than empirical: this document does not claim specific uptake percentages for the platform's programs, because those numbers can only be determined through pilot studies and rollout data. What this document does is map the risk surface.

Why Behavioral Economics Matters For This Platform

The platform's central claim is that median households save approximately $16,229 per year under the policy as designed. This figure is conditional on the household participating in the platform's programs as the design intends. It assumes universal healthcare coverage replaces private health insurance for the household. It assumes the wage floor exemption is applied to the household's federal income tax. It assumes the household's children, if eligible, are enrolled in subsidized childcare. It assumes the household receives the Founding Stake distribution. The savings figure becomes substantially smaller — possibly negative — for any household that pays the platform's contributions but fails to engage with its benefits.

This is not hypothetical. The Earned Income Tax Credit, which provides up to $7,830 per year to low-income working families, has historically been claimed by approximately 80 percent of eligible households according to IRS (Internal Revenue Service) estimates. That means roughly 1 in 5 eligible families — about 5 million households — never receive the credit despite qualifying for it. The reasons are a mix of complexity (filing requirements), trust (suspicion of government), awareness (some eligible filers do not know they qualify), and friction (those who do their own taxes may miss it; tax preparation costs may exceed the credit for some). For the platform, an EITC-style 80 percent uptake rate would mean roughly 26 million American households receiving fewer benefits than the platform promises while still paying its contributions. This would not be a small effect.

The platform has structural features that should produce better uptake than EITC. Universal healthcare is enrollment-by-default rather than opt-in. The wage floor exemption can be applied automatically through Direct File rather than requiring active claim. The Founding Stake distribution can be issued without application. These design choices matter and the platform is materially better positioned than EITC. But the platform also has features that introduce new friction: the choice between transition bridge credit and standard architecture; the interaction with state-administered programs (Medicaid, TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), childcare delivery); the wage floor exemption value depending on accurate occupation reporting; the contribution opt-outs (if any) for specific program components. Each friction point loses some eligible households. The cumulative effect across many small frictions can be substantial.

Where The Platform Is Architecturally Protected

Three platform design choices reduce exposure to behavioral friction in ways that should be acknowledged.

Default-In For Universal Programs

Universal Healthcare, universal childcare, and Universal Mental Health Access are designed as default-in rather than opt-in. A household becomes covered by universal healthcare when the platform deploys, not when the household completes an application. This is the most important behavioral design choice in the platform's architecture. The default effect is one of the most replicated findings in applied economics: making a beneficial outcome the default produces dramatically higher engagement than making it require active enrollment, even when the active enrollment process is simple. Studies of 401(k) auto-enrollment, organ donation registration (opt-out vs opt-in country comparisons), and benefits enrollment all show effect sizes in the range of 30 to 50 percentage points difference in participation between default-in and default-out structures.

For the platform, default-in coverage means that uptake friction primarily affects the few programs that require active engagement (the wage floor exemption claim through Direct File, the Bridge Credit eligibility evaluation, the Founding Stake distribution mechanics) rather than the bulk of the platform's value. This is a substantial structural advantage. It is also a substantial implementation challenge: making default-in work requires functional federal infrastructure that knows who is eligible without requiring proof from the household. Universal healthcare default-in works only if the federal government has accurate population data, which interacts with non-citizen status, address changes, custody changes, and other administrative realities. The Federal Identity Infrastructure planned under Civic Technology is supposed to handle this, but its functional adequacy at scale is an open question.

Direct File Removes Tax Preparation Friction

The platform's Civic Technology pillar commits to Direct File — a no-cost federal tax preparation system that handles the wage floor exemption calculation automatically. This addresses one of the most documented sources of EITC uptake gap: filers who use commercial tax preparation may have their preparer make errors, miss credits, or pressure them into refund-anticipation products. Filers who self-prepare may not know what to claim. Direct File means the platform's tax architecture works for any filer, including those who would otherwise pay $200-400 for tax preparation. This is a meaningful uptake protection.

Direct File works only if it is built well. The IRS has had limited success with Free File partnerships, where commercial preparers were supposed to provide free service to lower-income filers but instead used the program to upsell paid services. Direct File run directly by the federal government — the model the platform commits to — has shown promise in pilot programs but has not been scaled. The platform's commitment to Direct File is sound; whether the implementation can match the design is a function of investment, hiring, and political will rather than tax policy.

Refundability And Mandatory Distribution Reduce Claim-Dependent Loss

The Refundable Transition Bridge Credit is structured so that eligible households receive funds even if they have no tax liability against which to claim a credit. Refundability eliminates one specific failure mode where a low-income household qualifies for benefits but cannot claim them through the tax system because they owe no tax. The Founding Stake is structured as a mandatory distribution rather than a claimable credit, which similarly removes the active-application step. Both designs reduce uptake friction relative to standard claimable-credit architecture. They do not eliminate friction (a household without a bank account or known address still presents a delivery challenge) but they reduce its surface area.

Where The Platform Remains Exposed

Other parts of the platform require active engagement and are therefore exposed to predictable behavioral friction. Five exposure points warrant attention.

Exposure Point One: Occupation Reporting For wage floor

The wage floor exemption depends on knowing the household's occupation, because the floor is calculated as the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) 25th percentile wage for the worker's occupation. Two households earning the same gross income may have different floor values depending on occupational composition. This means accurate occupation reporting matters for getting the right tax outcome, and inaccurate occupation reporting (whether through error, ambiguity in classification, or strategic misrepresentation) introduces inequity.

Occupation reporting is not currently a high-friction step in tax filing — most filers simply identify themselves as the title their employer assigns. But the platform makes occupation tax-relevant in a new way, which creates behavioral incentives that did not exist before. Households whose actual occupation is in a low-floor category may have an incentive to report a higher-floor occupation. Households whose occupation is genuinely ambiguous (e.g., a hybrid technical-management role that could fit several BLS categories) may face genuine confusion. The platform's response should include three elements: a Direct File occupation lookup tool that helps users identify their correct BLS code; clear administrative rules for ambiguous cases; and an enforcement strategy that prevents systematic gaming without imposing audit burden on honest filers. None of these are currently specified in detail.

Exposure Point Two: State-Administered Program Interactions

Universal Childcare delivery, Medicaid restructuring, and several other platform components require state-level administration and cooperation. Behavioral research on Medicaid expansion shows that state administration choices have first-order effects on uptake. States with simple online enrollment, presumptive eligibility, and integrated benefits screening have substantially higher Medicaid enrollment among eligible populations than states with paper-only application, narrow eligibility windows, and program-by-program separate applications. The platform commits to federal funding for these programs but their actual delivery friction depends on state administrative choices that the platform cannot directly control.

This creates a politically uncomfortable but empirically true situation: the platform's effective benefit to a low-income family in a state with friction-friendly administration may be substantially higher than its effective benefit to an identical family in a state whose administration adds friction. State-level cooperation requirements (the subject of the companion document in v2.14) interact with behavioral economics: the platform's effects vary not just with what states do but with how they administer what they do. The platform's mathematical models do not currently capture this variation.

Exposure Point Three: Methodology Choice In Tax Filing

The platform's wage floor architecture is a more favorable tax treatment than the standard deduction for most households earning above the floor. But the platform must allow households to choose between methodologies for cases where standard deduction plus itemized deductions produces a better outcome (homeowners with substantial mortgage interest, charitable givers, those with high state/local taxes capped under SALT). This optionality is good policy — it preserves household autonomy and avoids worsening tax outcomes during the transition — but it introduces a behavioral choice that some filers will get wrong.

Direct File should default to whichever methodology is more favorable for the filer based on their actual income and deductions, and explain the choice clearly. This is technically straightforward but represents a real implementation requirement. If Direct File simply offers both options and lets the user choose without guidance, a meaningful fraction of filers will choose the worse option through confusion or default-acceptance of the first-presented option. The behavioral design here matters.

Exposure Point Four: Loss Aversion In Political Transition

Behavioral economics research on loss aversion suggests that people psychologically weight losses approximately twice as heavily as equivalent gains. The platform produces large gains for most households but requires changes that can be framed as losses: changes to existing employer health insurance arrangements, changes to retirement contribution structures, changes to what tax filing looks like, and the visibility of new federal contributions on the paystub. Even households who would benefit substantially from the platform may resist the transition because the visible losses (new contributions on the paystub, changes to familiar arrangements) are psychologically larger than the equivalent gains (lower premiums, no childcare bills, lower out-of-pocket medical) which arrive through different and less visible channels.

This is the platform's largest political vulnerability. The mathematical case is strong; the psychological case is harder. Existing universal-program transitions in other countries (the introduction of universal healthcare in Canada in the 1960s, Medicare in the United States, the National Health Service in the United Kingdom) all encountered substantial loss-aversion-driven opposition that their proponents underestimated. The platform should expect, plan for, and design around the same dynamic. Concrete design choices that mitigate loss aversion include: showing the gains in the same place the losses appear (e.g., the same paystub line that shows the new contribution should also show the absent premium); preserving existing arrangements during the transition rather than changing everything at once; allowing voluntary opt-in to platform components before mandatory transition; and clear communication about what is preserved versus what is changing.

Exposure Point Five: Information And Misinformation Asymmetry

The platform's complexity creates an information asymmetry that adversaries can exploit. The platform's actual provisions are hundreds of pages of analytical detail in the platform package; the platform's opponents can summarize their objections in single sentences. Behavioral research on political messaging shows that simple claims tend to dominate complex truths in low-attention environments, and most political environments are low-attention. The platform's informed citizenship pillar addresses this in principle but the practical question of how a typical household evaluates the platform during a contested political environment is not fully resolved by good documentation.

Defensive design choices include: producing the simplest possible accurate summaries of the platform's claims; preparing documented responses to anticipated misinformation attacks before they happen; investing in spokespeople who can communicate the platform clearly to non-policy audiences; and building feedback channels that detect emerging misinformation patterns early. The Constituent Letter document is one example; the slideshow is another. The full set of defensive communication infrastructure is not yet built.

Sensitivity Analysis: What If Uptake Is Less Than Modeled

The platform's mathematical models assume effective uptake of 100 percent for default-in programs and approximately 95 percent for active-claim programs (with the remaining 5 percent absorbed by the Refundable Transition Bridge Credit's safety net design). What happens to the platform's headline claims if real uptake is materially lower? (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

Three sensitivity scenarios warrant explicit analysis. Scenario A: 90 percent uptake (close to modeled). Scenario B: 80 percent uptake (EITC-equivalent). Scenario C: 70 percent uptake (poor performance, suggesting serious implementation problems).

Scenario A: 90 Percent Uptake

If 10 percent of eligible households fail to engage fully with the platform's benefits while still paying the contributions, the platform's per-household savings figure for the affected 10 percent flips from approximately $16,000 in savings to approximately $4,000 in net cost. This is because the contributions (approximately 4.8 percent of payroll across the three adjacent pillars) accrue regardless, while the benefits (premium replacement, childcare, mental health) accrue only with engagement. For a $75,000 household, 4.8 percent of payroll is $3,600 in mandatory contributions; with full benefits this is offset by approximately $19,000 in savings. Without benefits engagement, only the wage floor and Civic Infrastructure savings remain (approximately $4,650), leaving the household roughly $1,000 in net loss versus the current system. This is a politically significant outcome for the affected households even if 90 percent of households see the modeled outcome.

At the federal level, 90 percent uptake reduces total disbursed benefits by 10 percent (saving approximately $400 billion at mature steady state) while contributions remain unchanged. This improves the federal fiscal picture by approximately $400 billion per year — but only because some households are paying for benefits they do not receive. This is not a feature of the platform; it is a failure mode that produces fiscal savings through inequity.

Scenario B: 80 Percent Uptake

If 20 percent of eligible households fail to engage fully — the EITC equivalent rate — approximately 26 million households would experience the worst-case net loss described above. The platform's central political claim that median households save substantial money under the policy would still be true on average (the 80 percent who engage save the modeled amount), but a substantial minority would be net losers. This would be a plausible target for political attack and would represent a real distributional failure rather than a statistical artifact.

At 80 percent uptake the federal fiscal picture saves approximately $800 billion per year through under-disbursement, which is large enough to nearly close the platform's projected ongoing deficit reduction. The platform's mature steady-state fiscal claim depends materially on uptake rates being closer to 100 percent than to 80 percent.

Scenario C: 70 Percent Uptake

At 70 percent uptake, approximately 39 million households experience net loss under the platform versus the current system, and the platform's universal claim breaks down. This would be a policy failure, even if the 70 percent who engage are better off than they would be under the current system. Stable democracies do not implement major redistributive programs that produce net loss for 30 percent of the population, regardless of whether the median household sees gains. The platform should not deploy unless implementation infrastructure can credibly produce uptake rates substantially better than this scenario. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

Implementation Implications

The above analysis suggests several implementation requirements that the platform's mathematical models did not previously surface. None of these requirements is impossible; all of them are real.

Pilot studies before national rollout. The platform should not deploy without pilot data from a representative subset of states or metropolitan areas. The pilot data should specifically measure uptake rates for each platform component and identify the friction sources that most reduce engagement. Pilot scope should include both program design and administrative delivery, since the latter is at least as important as the former. A two-to-three-year pilot phase before nationwide deployment is a reasonable target.

Federal infrastructure as a precondition. Default-in programs require the federal government to know who is eligible without requiring household-level proof. This means functional Federal Identity Infrastructure, accurate population data, current address tracking, and integration across agencies that currently operate in silos. The platform's Civic Technology pillar commits to building this infrastructure but its development should be on the critical path of the deployment timeline rather than treated as a downstream nice-to-have. If the infrastructure is not ready, default-in becomes default-out for households the system fails to identify.

Loss-aversion-aware communication strategy. The platform's communication infrastructure should be designed with explicit awareness of loss aversion. Key principles: show the gains in the same place the losses appear; preserve familiar arrangements during the transition; allow voluntary opt-in for platform components before mandatory transition; provide clear before-and-after numbers for each household via the calculator and personalized communications; and preempt misinformation rather than reacting to it. The platform's existing communication materials (manifesto, slideshow, calculator, constituent letter) are good but are not a complete communications infrastructure. The full communications strategy is not yet built.

Dedicated administrative capacity for ambiguous cases. Several platform features (occupation classification for wage floor, methodology choice in tax filing, eligibility for the Bridge Credit) will produce ambiguous cases that require administrative judgment. The platform should fund dedicated capacity within the IRS and other relevant agencies to handle these cases promptly and consistently, not as an afterthought.

Open Questions

This document raises questions that the platform package does not currently answer. They are listed here for transparency and as a reminder that work remains.

What uptake rates should be expected for each platform component? The analysis above offers scenarios at 70, 80, and 90 percent but does not commit to a specific empirical estimate. Pilot studies are required to produce defensible projections. (Source baseline: see Sources_And_Derivation_Convention.docx.)

What is the platform's plan for the households that systematically fail to engage? Even with excellent design, some households (the most marginalized, the most distrustful, the most administratively excluded) will not receive the platform's benefits even though they pay its contributions. The platform's distributional claims are most violated for these households. The Refundable Transition Bridge Credit addresses some of this but does not fully cover the failure mode where someone pays contributions but never engages with benefits.

How should the platform's communication infrastructure be designed for loss aversion? The principles above are general; specific design choices (paystub redesign, transition timeline, opt-in periods, before-and-after personalized communications) require specific design work that has not yet been done.

What is the appropriate pilot scope? A two-to-three-year pilot is suggested, but the geographic scope, sampling strategy, and policy choices that should be tested before national rollout require further specification. The Path to Reality document addresses deployment timeline at a high level but does not currently specify pilot design.

How does the platform's behavioral risk profile interact with the political environment in which it would deploy? A deployment under unified federal control with broad public support is materially different from a deployment under contested political conditions. The platform's behavioral resilience varies with the implementation environment in ways the current package does not analyze.

How should the platform respond to systematic misinformation attacks? The Informed Citizenship pillar provides architectural infrastructure but specific defensive playbooks (detection, response protocols, rapid-correction channels) are not yet developed.

These open questions are real and material. The platform should not be presented as if they are resolved. The mathematical models in the package are correct as stated — given their assumptions — but the assumptions about behavioral engagement need empirical grounding before the platform's central claims can be made unconditionally.

Closing

Behavioral economics is not an objection to the platform; it is a discipline the platform must absorb. The platform's design includes substantial protections against predictable friction (default-in coverage, Direct File, refundability, mandatory distributions), and these protections matter. But the platform also has exposure points (occupation reporting, state-administered programs, methodology choice, loss aversion in transition, misinformation asymmetry) that the mathematical models do not currently quantify. A platform that ignores behavioral economics will deploy with miscalibrated expectations and underperform its design. A platform that absorbs behavioral economics — through pilot studies, infrastructure investment, careful communication, and dedicated administrative capacity for edge cases — can deliver close to its modeled benefits and absorb the political stress of transition. The latter is the design target. This document is a step toward formalizing what that design target requires.