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STATE-LEVEL COOPERATION

REQUIREMENTS

How Federal-State Boundaries Shape Platform Implementation

Which platform commitments are pure federal action?

Which require state cooperation, and what happens if states refuse?

How does the platform handle citizens who live in non-cooperating states?

An Analytical Framing Document

Jason Robertson

v1.0 · Created May 5, 2026 for v2.14

Ohio · 2026

The Question This Document Addresses

The platform makes commitments that span the entire federal-state structure of the American government. Some platform commitments are pure federal action: the federal income tax architecture, the wage floor exemption, the Sovereign Fund, the Founding Stake distribution, federal contributions to universal healthcare. Others require state cooperation: Medicaid restructuring, ACA marketplace integration, universal childcare delivery, last-mile broadband, Civic Technology integration with state services. A third category is largely state-administered with federal funding: childcare provider networks, mental health service delivery, identity infrastructure integration.

This federal-state distinction matters in three ways. First, the constitutional framework of American government limits what the federal government can compel states to do (anti-commandeering doctrine) versus what it can incentivize states to choose (conditional federal funding). Second, states have substantial political autonomy, which means a platform deployed under federal control still encounters state-level resistance, modification, or non-cooperation. Third, the citizen experience of the platform varies materially depending on whether the citizen lives in a cooperating state, a non-cooperating state, or a state in transition. The platform's mathematical models do not currently capture this variation.

This document maps the platform's commitments into the federal-state structure, identifies the constitutional and political constraints that shape what cooperation is achievable, examines the recent precedent of Medicaid expansion as the most relevant federal-state cooperation case, and analyzes what happens to citizens whose states do not cooperate. It then identifies which platform commitments are most exposed to state-level non-cooperation risk and what the platform's design should do about it.

Mapping Platform Commitments To Federal-State Categories

The platform's eight pillars and supporting infrastructure can be grouped by their federal-state structure. The grouping below uses three categories: pure federal (the platform can deliver this commitment without state cooperation), federal-state cooperative (the commitment works best with state cooperation but has some federal fallback if states refuse), and federal-funded state-administered (the commitment requires state action and the platform funds it but cannot force it).

Pure Federal Commitments

The federal income tax architecture, including the wage floor exemption replacing the standard deduction, is pure federal action. Congress and the Treasury have full authority over federal income tax structure. State income tax structures are unaffected (and remain a household-level cost the platform does not change). The Sovereign Fund is pure federal action; its corpus is held federally and disbursements are federal payments to households or federal program funding. The Founding Stake distribution is pure federal action through the same channels. Universal Healthcare contributions (the 4% employer plus 2% employee payroll contribution) are pure federal action through payroll tax mechanisms. The Refundable Transition Bridge Credit is pure federal through the federal tax system. Direct File is pure federal — built by the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) — and replaces commercial tax preparation rather than depending on it.

These commitments together represent approximately the wage floor mechanism's $3,500 in median household savings, the Sovereign Fund's downstream revenue contributions, the Founding Stake's universal $2 distribution, and the universal healthcare funding architecture's $660 billion in mature steady-state revenue. They proceed regardless of state position. A citizen in any state experiences the federal tax architecture, the Sovereign Fund's federal fiscal effects, the Founding Stake distribution, and the universal healthcare contribution system identically.

Federal-State Cooperative Commitments

Universal Healthcare delivery is federal-state cooperative. The platform's funding architecture is pure federal but the actual healthcare delivery touches state-licensed providers, state insurance regulation, and state Medicaid programs that the platform restructures. The platform's universal coverage is intended to be universal — every American with healthcare access — but the mechanics of how that coverage interacts with state-licensed hospitals, state Medicaid waiver programs, and state insurance markets requires cooperation. Without state cooperation, the platform can fund universal coverage but state-level administrative obstruction can degrade the citizen experience (providers refusing to accept the coverage, state Medicaid programs refusing to coordinate, state insurance regulators imposing operational constraints).

Universal Childcare is federal-state cooperative for similar reasons. Federal funding can support a $10-per-day childcare program (the Quebec model the platform's substantiation document references) but the actual childcare delivery happens through state-licensed providers, state-administered subsidy programs, and state-regulated facility standards. A state can functionally block universal childcare delivery by failing to license providers under the new system, refusing federal subsidy administration funding, or imposing regulatory requirements that no provider can meet.

Universal Mental Health Access is federal-state cooperative through state-licensed providers and state professional licensure structures.

The Civic Infrastructure pillar includes state-cooperative elements: physical Civic Infrastructure depends on state and local cooperation for siting, construction, and maintenance; Civic Technology integration requires state systems to interoperate with federal Civic Technology infrastructure; energy grid modernization works through state utility commissions and state-regulated utilities.

Together, the federal-state cooperative commitments represent the bulk of the platform's per-household visible value: the $9,500 per capita healthcare commitment, the $10-per-day childcare access, the broadband universal access. Their effective delivery to citizens depends on state cooperation that is not guaranteed. The platform's design must include credible answers to the question of what happens when a state refuses to cooperate.

Federal-Funded State-Administered Commitments

Some platform commitments are even more state-dependent: federal funding flows to states which then design and operate the program. This category includes restructured Medicaid (the Federal Program Integration Plan describes Medicaid working-age coverage being absorbed into universal healthcare; the residual long-term care, HCBS (Home and Community-Based Services) waiver, and CHIP (Children's Health Insurance Program) supplemental coverage continues through state-administered Medicaid with federal financial support); childcare provider network development (federal funds flow to states which contract with providers); mental health service delivery infrastructure; and several Civic Infrastructure components that interact with state programs.

The federal-funded state-administered category is where the platform's effective delivery varies most across states. A state with strong administrative capacity, simple enrollment, and integrated benefits screening can deliver substantially better outcomes than a state with paper-only application, narrow eligibility windows, and program-by-program separate applications. Both states are nominally implementing the same platform commitment with the same federal funding; their actual delivery quality differs by an order of magnitude.

Constitutional Constraints

The federal government cannot simply order states to administer programs as the federal government wishes. Two doctrines define the constraint: anti-commandeering and conditional federal spending.

The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine

Under New York v. United States (1992) and Printz v. United States (1997), the federal government cannot compel state legislatures to enact federal programs or compel state officers to administer federal programs. The federal government can pass laws of national application that operate directly on individuals (federal income tax, federal universal healthcare contributions, federal benefits distributions). The federal government cannot pass laws that order states to do things on the federal government's behalf.

For the platform, anti-commandeering means: the federal income tax architecture and the wage floor exemption operate directly on filers (constitutional); the federal Sovereign Fund operates as federal property (constitutional); federal universal healthcare contributions operate as federal payroll taxes (constitutional). But the federal government cannot order a state to license childcare providers under platform standards, cannot order a state's Medicaid agency to coordinate with federal universal healthcare, and cannot order a state utility commission to follow federal energy grid modernization specifications. These activities require state choice.

Conditional Federal Spending

The federal government can attach conditions to federal funding that flows to states. South Dakota v. Dole (1987) established the general framework: conditions must be related to the federal interest, must be unambiguous (states must know what they are agreeing to), cannot themselves violate constitutional provisions, and cannot be coercive. The Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion was struck down (in part) in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012) on the coercion ground: tying existing Medicaid funding to acceptance of expansion was held to be effectively forcing states' hands rather than offering them a real choice.

For the platform, conditional spending means: the federal government can offer states substantial federal funding for childcare delivery on condition of meeting platform standards, but cannot make the conditions so onerous that refusal becomes impossible. The federal government can offer to absorb most state Medicaid working-age population costs on condition of cooperation with the integrated coverage architecture, but if it tries to leverage existing Medicaid funding (long-term care, CHIP supplements) as a coercion mechanism, NFIB v. Sebelius suggests that approach would be struck down. The platform's federal-state cooperative commitments need to be designed as genuinely attractive offers rather than as coercion.

The Medicaid Expansion Precedent

The Affordable Care Act's Medicaid expansion is the most directly relevant federal-state cooperation case in recent history. The ACA offered states substantial federal funding (initially 100 percent of expansion costs, declining to 90 percent by 2020 and remaining at 90 percent thereafter) in exchange for expanding Medicaid coverage to all adults under 138 percent of the federal poverty line. NFIB v. Sebelius made the expansion optional. As of 2024, ten states have not adopted Medicaid expansion despite the substantial federal funding offered.

The pattern of non-expansion has been politically determined rather than fiscally determined. Non-expansion states forgo billions of dollars in federal funding annually and leave their citizens without coverage that adjacent states provide. The non-expansion states are concentrated geographically (most are in the South) and the political opposition is rooted in broader resistance to the ACA, not in cost-benefit analysis of the specific expansion offer. Multiple non-expansion states have tried and failed to pass expansion through legislation but succeeded through ballot initiatives (Idaho, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah). Some governors have proposed expansion only to have legislatures block it.

The lessons for the platform are direct. First, even an attractive federal funding offer encounters political opposition that is not driven by the offer's economic merit. The platform's federal-state cooperative commitments will encounter the same resistance regardless of how favorably they are structured. Second, the political opposition tends to be concentrated in particular states and tends to be persistent — non-expansion in Florida and Texas has continued for over a decade despite repeated attempts to change it. Third, citizens in non-cooperating states are real victims of the political dynamic: residents of non-expansion states have higher uninsured rates, worse health outcomes, and pay federal taxes that fund expansion in other states. The platform's design needs to account for this pattern, not pretend it will not occur.

What Happens To Citizens In Non-Cooperating States

If a state refuses to cooperate with platform implementation — whether by refusing federal funds for childcare administration, refusing to integrate state Medicaid with federal universal healthcare, refusing to license providers under platform standards, or actively obstructing platform delivery — what is the citizen's experience?

For pure federal commitments, the citizen experience is identical across states. The wage floor exemption, the Founding Stake, the federal income tax architecture, and the federal universal healthcare contribution all operate directly on the citizen regardless of state position. The federal Sovereign Fund's effects (downstream revenue, deficit reduction, intergenerational wealth transfer) accrue to the federal level and are not state-mediated.

For federal-state cooperative commitments, the citizen experience is materially worse in non-cooperating states. A citizen in a state that refuses universal healthcare delivery cooperation faces: paying the federal universal healthcare contribution (4% employer + 2% employee through payroll); not receiving universal healthcare coverage they paid for; needing to maintain private health insurance at premium levels comparable to current (since state-level obstruction prevents the platform from displacing private insurance); experiencing the worst possible outcome from the platform's design. This is the same pattern as non-expansion Medicaid: residents pay for benefits they cannot access.

The platform must include design choices that address this exposure. Three are worth considering. First, federal-direct delivery options for cases of state non-cooperation: if a state refuses to cooperate with universal healthcare delivery, the federal government should be able to deliver coverage directly through federal facilities, federal contracting, or federally-administered alternatives. This was not how Medicaid expansion was structured, and it is part of why non-expansion has persisted: the federal government had no fallback. The platform should design federal-direct fallbacks for every federal-state cooperative commitment so that state refusal does not strand citizens. Second, the platform should consider partial-credit refunds for residents of non-cooperating states. If a citizen is paying contributions but cannot access the corresponding benefit due to state non-cooperation, the platform should refund the contribution proportionally or provide an enhanced Bridge Credit to compensate. Third, the platform should publicly track which states are cooperating versus not, with periodic reports to Congress, so that the political costs of non-cooperation are visible to voters in those states.

Cooperation Incentive Design

The platform's federal-state cooperative commitments should be designed to maximize the probability of state cooperation. This means structuring offers that make refusal politically and economically costly while remaining within the constitutional bounds of conditional federal spending.

Financial Incentive Magnitude

The Medicaid expansion experience suggests that even very large financial incentives (90 to 100 percent federal cost coverage) are insufficient to compel cooperation when there is political opposition to the underlying program. The platform's offers therefore should not assume financial magnitude alone is sufficient. They should be financially attractive but the design also needs non-financial features that increase cooperation probability.

Bipartisan Frame Where Possible

The platform's federal-state cooperative commitments should be designed where possible to attract bipartisan support at the state level. This means framing childcare as supporting working families across the political spectrum (rather than as a specific ideological claim), framing healthcare delivery integration as administrative efficiency (rather than as a federal takeover), and framing infrastructure investment as economic development (rather than as federal centralization). Whether this framing actually succeeds politically is an empirical question that the platform cannot resolve in advance, but design choices that maintain the bipartisan frame are more likely to succeed than design choices that explicitly identify the platform as a partisan project.

Local Control Preservation

Federal-state cooperative commitments should preserve maximum local control consistent with the platform's standards. States should be able to choose how to deliver universal childcare within broad federal standards rather than being required to use a specific federal model. States should be able to integrate platform-funded mental health services with their existing infrastructure rather than being required to build parallel systems. The federal contribution should fund outcomes (universal access, defined quality standards) rather than dictate processes. This both increases state cooperation likelihood and produces better localized delivery.

Phased Cooperation Pathways

States should not be required to accept the entire platform's federal-state commitments as a single yes-or-no choice. The platform should support partial cooperation pathways: a state can choose to cooperate with universal childcare delivery while declining to cooperate with Universal Mental Health, for example. This preserves the partial benefit for state residents and avoids forcing all-or-nothing decisions that maximize the political cost of cooperation.

Specific State-Cooperation-Dependent Commitments

The following platform commitments are most exposed to state-level non-cooperation risk and warrant specific design attention.

Universal Childcare Delivery

Quebec-model childcare requires state-licensed providers, state-administered subsidies, and state-regulated facility standards. A state that declines to cooperate functionally blocks delivery. The platform's federal funding (planned at approximately 0.8 percent + 0.5 percent of payroll) cannot deploy as universal childcare in a non-cooperating state. The federal-direct fallback for childcare is more difficult than for healthcare because childcare requires physical facilities, licensed providers, and ongoing operational management at scale. Plausible federal-direct mechanisms include: federal grants directly to private childcare providers in non-cooperating states (bypassing state administration); contracts with multi-state childcare networks that operate across cooperating and non-cooperating states; direct federal childcare facilities operated through existing federal infrastructure (military bases with families, federal employees with children, etc.) extended to surrounding communities. None of these is a complete substitute for state cooperation.

Medicaid Restructuring

The Federal Program Integration Plan describes Medicaid working-age population coverage being absorbed into federal universal healthcare while long-term care, HCBS waivers, and CHIP supplemental coverage continue through state-administered Medicaid with federal financial support. A state that refuses to cooperate with this restructuring faces a difficult position: it can refuse the absorption (continuing to administer working-age Medicaid through current state mechanisms with current state financial obligations) or accept (transferring working-age coverage to federal universal healthcare and reducing state Medicaid scope). The federal offer is attractive because it relieves states of substantial financial obligation, but the political dynamic of accepting federal coverage of currently state-administered programs may not match the financial logic. The platform's design should include both pathways: federal absorption for cooperating states; continued state administration for non-cooperating states with citizens still receiving federal universal healthcare contribution-funded coverage through alternative mechanisms.

Universal Broadband Last Mile

Universal Broadband requires state and local cooperation for last-mile deployment: rights of way, pole attachment access, permitting, and integration with existing utility infrastructure. A state can functionally block last-mile deployment in low-density areas. The platform's federal funding can build federal middle-mile infrastructure but the last mile to households requires local action. The Two Paths Compared analytical document addresses this; the federal-direct fallback options are limited and expensive. State and local cooperation is effectively required for full broadband universality.

Civic Technology Integration

The Civic Technology pillar's effectiveness depends on state systems integrating with federal Civic Technology infrastructure. Driver's licenses, voter registration, business filings, professional licensure, and many other civic touchpoints currently happen at state level. Federal universal identity infrastructure can be built, but its useful integration with state services requires state cooperation. Non-cooperating states leave their residents with worse Civic Technology experience: more friction in cross-state interactions, more difficulty maintaining federal benefits when moving between states, more administrative burden generally. This is a real exposure point that the platform does not currently address in detail.

Open Questions

This document raises questions that the platform package does not currently fully resolve. They are listed here for transparency.

What is the platform's plan if multiple large states refuse cooperation? The Medicaid expansion precedent suggests that 10-20 percent of states may refuse cooperation persistently. If California, Texas, Florida, and New York all refused cooperation (a hypothetical extreme case), the platform's universal claims would break down for over 30 percent of the US population. The platform's plan for this scenario is not currently developed.

What is the constitutional viability of the platform's specific federal-direct fallback designs? The federal government's authority to deliver healthcare directly (rather than through Medicaid-style state cooperation) is broader than its authority to compel state action, but specific design choices may face constitutional challenge. Legal review of each federal-direct fallback design is needed before deployment.

How should the platform handle citizens who move between cooperating and non-cooperating states? Coverage continuity, contribution credit transfer, and benefit eligibility for movers are not currently specified in detail.

What administrative capacity does the federal government need to deliver federal-direct fallbacks? Current federal agencies (HHS, IRS, Treasury, USDA) do not have the operational capacity to deliver state-equivalent services to 30+ percent of the population if many states refuse cooperation. Building this capacity is itself a multi-year program.

How should the platform's funding flow be structured to preserve state political incentive to cooperate? If federal funds flow regardless of state cooperation (through federal-direct fallbacks), state legislatures may face less pressure to cooperate. Conversely, if federal funds flow only with state cooperation, citizens in non-cooperating states are stranded. The right balance between these failure modes is not obvious.

How does the platform's federal-state structure interact with US territories (where federal-state structure does not apply)? This is the subject of a separate analytical document planned for v2.18.

How should the platform address subnational entities other than states (DC, federally recognized tribes, territorial governments) in the federal-state cooperation framework? These entities operate under different constitutional rules than states and require specific treatment.

Closing

The platform's effective delivery to citizens depends on the federal-state cooperation framework as much as it depends on the federal architecture itself. Federal commitments deliver to all citizens regardless of state position; federal-state cooperative commitments deliver substantially better in cooperating states than in non-cooperating ones; federal-funded state-administered commitments depend almost entirely on state administrative quality. The platform's mathematical models do not currently capture this variation, and its citizen-facing communications do not currently explain it. This is a transparency gap that the platform should close before deployment.

The Medicaid expansion precedent shows that political opposition to federal programs persists even when financial incentives are large and when refusing imposes substantial costs on state residents. The platform should expect 10-20 percent of states to refuse cooperation persistently. Federal-direct fallbacks for the most critical commitments (universal healthcare delivery, partial credit refunds for residents of non-cooperating states) should be designed before deployment so that state refusal does not strand citizens. Public tracking of state cooperation status, with clear reporting on which states are cooperating versus not, is part of the platform's accountability infrastructure and is currently underdeveloped.

The federal-state structure of American government is not an impediment to the platform; it is a constraint within which the platform must deliver. Working with the structure rather than against it produces better outcomes than pretending the structure can be ignored. This document begins the work of mapping that structure into the platform's design. Subsequent versions should formalize the federal-direct fallback designs, the cooperation tracking infrastructure, the partial-credit refund mechanisms, and the constitutional review of specific implementation choices.